Emerging India: Insecure and unsafe

NEWS REDIFF

http://news.rediff.com/column/2009/sep/22/colonel-athale-bemoans-the-absence-of-an-indian-military-strategy.htm

Colonel Anil A Athale (retd) says India's [ Images ] indifference to strategic and defence requirements can cost it dear. A two-part column:
A student of military history would be justified in feeling a sense of deja vu at recent happenings. Former Pakistan president Pervez Musharraf [ Images ] disclosed that he used American aid not against terrorists but to bolster Pakistani capabilities against India. Our leaders then go ballistic and beseech the Americans!
Cut to April/May 1965 -- Pakistan used the Patton tanks against India in the Rann [ Images ] of Kutch -- we spend time and energy in taking photographs and again go to the Americans.
As in 1962, we seem to downplay Chinese intrusions -- not unlike the famous Nehruvian jibe about Aksai Chin that not a blade of grass grows there!
To cap it all is the recent disclosure by nuclear scientist Dr K Santhanam, that the May 1998 thermonuclear test was less than 100 percent successful has fuelled a much needed debate on our security and defence preparedness. Dr Santhanam is a scientist connected with India's nuclear programme and his views have to be taken seriously. Since 1998, India has openly shifted from 'defence' to 'deterrence' as cornerstone of its security policies.
India did not have much choice in the matter. In the decade of 1980s a reckless US supplied weapon systems to Pakistan (the F-16s) which in turn for the first time gave that country reach and bomb weight to pose a direct threat to Indian cities. Our nuclear reactors came under threat. Thus should Pakistan have so chosen it could target these and virtually 'nuke' India?
The critics of 1998 Pokhran II and an overt Indian nuclear posture to 'deter' this attack, ignore this reality. All that the 'Shakti' tests did was to go for overt in place of 'covert deterrence', itself a contradiction in terms. Ten years have passed and during this time these theories were severely tested and a comprehensive debate ought to be welcome.
While the attention of Indians and the world is focussed on the economic progress of our country, the age-old weakness of our civilisation -- the neglect of the security dimension, casts a long dark shadow on our future.
India is unique in several ways -- unlike other countries, in India ardent and idealist 'peace lobbies' are part of mainstream politics and not on the fringes as in all other countries of the world. In its 5,000-year-old history, India has produced treatises on virtually every subject on the earth, from astronomy, medicine to even sex, but we do not have a single major work on warfare or the art of war.
Time and again our use of war elephants was shown to be ineffective, yet we persisted in it.
We were the first to use war rockets in the 18th century, but never developed them to make them bigger, longer or more effective. Intellectuals stayed away from the war strategy and weapons.
We refused to change with the times.
In the nuclear age as well we seem to be repeating our dismal history. The new 'mantra' is minimum deterrence and second strike capability as panacea solution to face all threats. India went wrong in Kargil [ Images ] in 1999 when we realised that the proxy aggression 'used 'the nuclear umbrella while we lulled ourselves.
The 2002 Operation Parakaram in the wake of the attack on Parliament as well as our inability to react to the Mumbai [ Images ] attacks on 26/11 showed the limits of our retaliatory capability.
Through successful use of rhetoric and threats, Pakistan neutralised our conventional response.
Now over the last 10 years it has become an established pattern of behaviour on our part. Our strategy of retaliation with surgical strikes or the new strategy of 'cold start' remains moribund and ineffective for the enemy believes and rightly so, that we lack the will and wherewithal to implement it.
Our conventional retaliation strategy lacks 'credibility' and therefore is no deterrent. The issue is not of mere 'will' either. India lacks the overwhelming technological/numerical superiority to implement this. For instance, Israel has been successfully employing 'threat of retaliation' as a deterrent to proxy or terrorist threats. Israeli technical prowess makes it a credible threat and its past behaviour has established its will to act.
In 1773, the small kingdom of Thanjavur was threatened by the combined forces of the Karnataka [ Images ] nawab and the British. As enemy troops massed outside the city, the high priests of the famed Thanjavur temple assured the king that their 'mantra' was powerful enough to defeat the invaders, and went on to sprinkle the water sanctified by the 'mantra' to stop the invasion! Of course the 'mantra' failed and the kingdom was annexed by the British.
Today we have the high priests of nuclear strategy in Delhi [ Images ] similarly chanting the 'mantra' of no first use and minimum deterrence! Will the result be any different than at Thanjavur in the 18th century?
An analysis of why 'we are like that only' is necessary so that we can rectify this fatal flaw in our national psyche.
The Diagnosis: What ails Indian thinking on defence?
We are a peculiar nation that is obsessed with the 'eternal truth' while we ignore the 'practical' or the realistic world. Carl Jung, the Swedish psychologist visiting India about a century ago, had remarked about this and felt (as a Westerner) as if the whole country lived in a trance or maya or illusion.
Let me illustrate. It is a fundamental belief of Indians that there are no evil beings only evil deeds and fundamentally the atman or the soul is universal and part of the divine in all of us.
While this is so, yet there are evil individuals, for instance the terrorists who mercilessly killed hundreds in Mumbai or have been planting bombs in busy trains and markets. We have to deal with this evil ruthlessly. But what do the Indians do? We question every action of the police/armed forces, we have karuna or pity for the Mumbai terrorists.
The list of our foundational weaknesses is a long one. Here I would just mention it and leave the rest to the reader's imagination.

• We tend to think that security is the sole prerogative of the armed forces and police.
• Divorce between theorists and practitioners -- it is politically incorrect to think of national security in academia -- the British implanted a colonial mindset whereby Indians were kept out of this vital area. Even 62 years after independence this persists.
• The lack of strategic culture -- in case of nuclear strategy we have scientists as strategists -- like asking chemist to prescribe medicines (as many Indians do).
• Segmented approach to security -- armed forces kept away from decision making on the nuclear issue.
• Treating low intensity, conventional and nuclear conflicts in isolation and denying the linkages between them.
• Isolating defence industry/research from mainstream and colossal inefficiency of the bureaucratic structure of the Defence Research and Development Organisation empire.

As usual India is left to fight its own battles

NEWS REDIFF
 
http://news.rediff.com/column/2009/dec/08/column-rajeev-srinivasan-on-obamas-af-pak-plan.htm

There is no doubt United States President Barack Obama [ Images ] had a difficult task to perform in making his long-awaited Afghanistan speech recently. There has been a clamour of different voices urging him to take every position, from digging in for the long term all the way to an immediate withdrawal, and the only option Obama really had was to take a median position that would certainly disappoint large sections of his voters.

In a sense, the speech turned out to be a bit of a damp squib: It must be extremely unsatisfying to officer cadets at West Point (America's premier military academy) to be told that their nation was effectively in a war it could not win. And that the only thing to do was to find a face-saving exit. Besides, it really didn't say anything new other than the laying out of a time-frame for the exit.

It was common knowledge all along that the Obama Af-Pak plan was simple: 'Surge, bribe, declare victory and run like hell.'

The bribery plan has taken more concrete steps now. Hillary Clinton [ Images ] announced that there were 'non-violent Taliban' [ Images ] (isn't that a contradiction in terms?), and therefore one has to presume the Americans are busy figuring out which are the 'good Taliban' (hint: Those not attacking the Pakistani army). These are the ones to bribe before the part about declaring victory loudly and heading for the exit.

One has to sympathise with Obama, who is in a bit of a spot. Two unwinnable wars are draining his treasury. The financial meltdown and related fallout has hit his economy hard. His hard-core supporters are wondering when he will deliver on his campaign rhetoric of change and hope, because so far there has been little change and not much hope. The fence-sitters are beginning to desert him, as the results of mid-term elections and opinion polls suggest. For someone who is in permanent campaign mode, this is altogether disturbing.

The timing of the pullout from Afghanistan, naturally, is intended to give Obama sound-bites for the mid-term elections in 2012.

Afghanistan is, alas, looking more and more like Vietnam; even the blame game, where suddenly the Americans seem to have discovered that their hand-picked man, Hamid Karzai [ Images ], is the fount of all corruption, is like Vietnam. The generals in Afghanistan are not filing enthusiastic and breathless forecasts like Westmoreland did in Vietnam, however: they are, perhaps because of more widespread information, less optimistic and probably more realistic about what can be achieved.

The root cause of the problem in Afghanistan, unlike in Iraq, is simple: The Americans are labouring mightily to ignore the elephant in the living room, Pakistan's agenda. It is as clear as daylight to the casual observer that Pakistan has no interest whatsoever in bringing stability to Afghanistan, in preventing the Taliban from coming back to power there, or in capturing Osama bin Laden [ Images ] and other Al Qaeda [ Images ] operatives: And these are the alleged reasons why the Americans are in Afghanistan.

Pakistan has clearly articulated its pursuit of strategic depth which, for instance, involves having a Plan B even if its major cities such as Karachi, Lahore [ Images ] and Rawalpindi, close to the India [ Images ]n border, are obliterated in a possible Indian nuclear second strike (after Pakistan has wiped out Delhi [ Images ] and Mumbai [ Images ] in a first strike). They want to regroup from Afghanistan and continue their jihad against India from there.

The Taliban, of course, are Pakistani army and ISI soldiers dressed in baggy pants and beards for the occasion. The fact that alleged seminary students (who the Taliban are supposed to be) suddenly started driving tanks and flying planes is indirect evidence that they were trained soldiers. Therefore, Taliban rule in Kabul means Pakistan has achieved its strategic depth.

Clearly, they have no desire to fight or eliminate the Taliban, despite the fact that some factions (such as the one from the Mehsud tribe) have begun to inconvenience Pakistan through a campaign of suicide bombings.

Dead Pakistani civilians are considered acceptable collateral damage by the ISI, but their attacks on the military apparatus is a big no-no. They are clearly 'bad Taliban', and will not get any share of the spoils.

The fact that the Americans condone Pakistani support for the Taliban was made most evident during the siege of Kunduz some years ago. It was evident to observers then that the massive airlift of besieged Taliban -- allegedly hundreds of senior officers were rescued from the advancing Northern Alliance with the full knowledge of the CIA -- was an effort to hide the evidence about ISI involvement with the Taliban. They allowed the alleged Taliban to escape to Islamabad [ Images ] and resume their day jobs as brigadiers and colonels in the Pakistani Army and the ISI.

If the Northern Alliance, then in full cry, had been able to capture or liquidate these officers, it would have broken the backbone of the Taliban war effort.

A recent report from the US Senate accused the then-leaders of the war effort, Donald Rumsfeld and General Petraeus, of a signal failure in late 2001: Apparently the Senate has found that it would have been entirely possible to capture Osama bin Laden in the Tora Bora mountains then, if only a large force of American troops had been deployed in search operations, instead of the few hundreds.

All this brings into sharp focus the nexus between the CIA and the ISI. (The more recent story of Daood Gilani alias David Headley, who has been charged with criminal conspiracy for the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, also suggests unholy connections between the two).

There are some seriously opaque things going on between the Americans and the Pakistanis, and the billions paid by the Bush and Obama administration have vanished without a trace. (With their friend Robin Raphel now in charge of disbursing funds, the ISI must be breaking out the champagne -- such incredible good luck!)

So long as the Americans are willing to subscribe to the fiction that Pakistanis are serious about fighting terrorism, there is no way that Pakistan can lose. As a result, the planned departure of the Americans in 2011 should be welcome news for Indians.

Presumably, once they leave, as they did after the Soviet debacle in the 1980s, Americans will lose interest in Pakistan and cease to write them blank cheques (which usually end up killing Indians).

However, as General McChrystal suggested recently, chances are that the US is going to lean on India to 'make concessions on Kashmir' [ Images ], to stop its humanitarian operations in Afghanistan and to close its consulates there. Pakistan has alleged that Indians are interfering in Baluchistan -- which I hope they are, but it is unlikely: a former prime minister, in a burst of misplaced enthusiasm, gutted the RAW counter-intelligence operations there.

The first sign of this pressure is already evident in the UPA government's announcement of large troop withdrawals from J&K, leaving it to the local police, whose sympathies are not necessarily with the Indian nation.

The reality of American sentiment was demonstrated by Richard Holbrooke [ Images ] who held a cringing press conference to assure Pakistanis that there was no tilt towards India. Clearly in Afghan War 2.0, America is going to be ever more dependent on the tender mercies of the ISI.

Obama concluded his speech with the mantra -- regarding Pakistan -- of 'mutual interests, mutual respect, and mutual trust.' The cynic in me thinks Obama better lock up the family silver, as he is deluding himself regarding Pakistan's fundamentalist kleptocrats.

Besides, the exit timeline -- even though it does not mean all troops leave then, and there has been a lot of 'clarifications' that even the date is not cast in stone -- implies that the Americans have no stomach to fight on any longer in Afghanistan beyond 2011. This, in effect, means they have been defeated.

The essence of military strategy is to demoralise the enemy by all means possible, and from that perspective Taliban psy-ops have won. This will be a significant morale-booster to the jihadis: they can legitimately claim to have defeated both the Soviets and the Americans. This will embolden their triumphalist attacks on US targets, and on India.

The Americans have a difficult choice, caught as they are with no really attractive options. Add to this Obama's personal preferences, wherein his tendency is to be an internationalist, and to jaw-jaw where Bush may have gone for war-war.

It is not clear that these are bad things per se, but it remains to be seen whether they are the right things for this war, or for the colder war against China. There is an element of 'paralysis by analysis', and some have begun to call Obama the 'Great Ditherer'.

There is a worst case scenario: The possibility that, given the deadline of 18 months that Obama has outlined for the beginning of the exit, there will be a headlong and ignominious retreat from Kabul. I remember the photographs from Saigon in 1975 with the last helicopters taking off from the American embassy with people desperately hanging on. Vietnam scarred America's soul, but Communism did not win, and the Domino Theory turned out to be wrong: Communists are susceptible to the charms of the market.

The Afghan game is altogether different: It may crush America's soul. If the jihadis gain sustenance from the American defeat there, there will be no respite: They will keep on attacking, as they are not easily distracted from their goal of global dominance, which they believe is within their grasp. Indeed they may be right, because there is a short window of opportunity when vast petro-dollars are at their disposal. The near-default of sovereign debt in Dubai [ Images ] shows that the petro-dollars may well be ephemeral, and that they had better strike when the iron is hot.

America is clearly suffering from imperial overreach. Not that America is a ruined country, but compared to the can-do and supremely confident nation it was a few years ago -- the sole hyperpower proclaiming the end of history -- it is suffering from serious self-doubt, and it is beginning to see the shadows of decline everywhere, even in its crowning glory, the civil engineering marvels that span the nation.

American's involvement in Afghanistan, if it had been a whole-hearted war against the forces of terrorism, would have been positive for India. But given that it merely enriched the Pakistanis while retaining intact the entire infrastructure -- both the ISI and the radicalised army -- the Afghan war has not really helped India.

Indeed, the Northern Alliance -- assuming that its tactical genius Ahmed Shah Massoud had not been assassinated -- may well have driven the Taliban out or at least fought them to a standstill. In hindsight, the American intercession in Afghanistan has been a net negative for India.

As things stand, it now appears that it is better from India's perspective for the Americans to leave. As usual, India is left to fight its own battles. Unfortunately, the two parties that will benefit the most from the American debacle in Afghanistan are India's sworn enemies: China and Pakistan.

China, because the loss is likely to turn America inward, and in any case they have now been convinced by Chinese bluster that there has to be a G-2. Pakistan, of course, is richer by some $25 billion some of which is in numbered accounts somewhere, and the rest in nuclear and other weapons pointed at India.

For China, the Vietnam analogy is apt again. There, a Chinese proxy defeated the Americans; in Afghanistan, another Chinese proxy, Pakistan, may defeat America. In Korea, China fought America to a standstill. Score: China -- 2.5, America -- 0.5. No doubt this, along with Obama's kowtowing in Beijing [ Images ], will embolden further Chinese adventurism.

India is already seeing the beginning of this, as Chinese are building 27 airstrips in occupied Tibet [ Images ], and just ordered Indians to stop building a road in J&K, explaining that it was their territory.

Obama should learn from India's experience: A vacillating, dithering and appeasing nation gets no respect from those who have a a clear long-term intent.

How China views India's new defence doctrine

NEWS REDIFF

 http://news.rediff.com/column/2010/jan/07/how-china-views-indias-new-defence-doctrine.htm

China experts feel Indian defence strategy treats China, not Pakistan, as priority target, which they also believe provides for a partial border war, writes D S Rajan. 

Reports on India's revision of its defence doctrine to meet the challenges of a 'two front war' with Pakistan and China have of late received media focus. Pakistan has been prompt in its response, describing India's reported move as 'betraying hostile intent' and reflecting a 'hegemonic and jingoistic mindset'. 

The People's Republic of China does not appear to have come out so far with any official reaction on the subject; interesting however is that the same theme of India's 'two front war', worded a bit differently as 'two front mobile warfare' has figured in an in-depth authoritative Chinese evaluation of India's defence strategy, done as early as November 2009; it raises a question whether or not Beijing [ Images ] already knew about India's reported revision of its defence strategy. This apart, it would be important to have a close look at what has been said in that analysis, for drawing meaningful conclusions. What follows is an attempt in that direction.

Titled 'Great Changes in India's Defence Strategy -- War objective shifts to giving China importance, while treating Pakistan as lightweight', the analysis contributed by Hao Ding, a researcher of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, published in the Party-affiliated Chinese language organ, China Youth Daily, on November 27, 2009, identifies following five shifts that have taken place in India's defence strategy: 

'In terms of goals, India now aims at becoming a global military power in contrast to its earlier objective to acquire a regional military power status.' (The author's comments say in this connection that prior to end of the cold war, India followed an expansionist and hegemonic policy in South Asia, dismembered Pakistan, annexed Sikkim kingdom and dispatched troops to Sri Lanka [ Images ] and Maldives [ Images ]. 

In the 21st century, India's national interests are expanding and accordingly, it is striving to protect its strategic superiority in the South Asian sub-continent as well as the Indian Ocean region. Simultaneously, India is actively projecting its power into the Asia-Pacific region, attempting to gradually become an Asia-Pacific power instead of being only a South Asian power. It is taking efforts to emerge as 'a major and positive geo-strategic player' in the Eurasian political chessboard. For this, India would require to work towards achieving strategic balance of power with countries outside like the US and China, operate beyond South Asia and Indian Ocean region and develop as a world military power. 

'From the point of view of strategic guidelines, India has shifted to a line of 'active and aggressive defence', as a departure from the past position of 'passive defence'. (The analysis views that India has realised that in the 21st century, security threats to it are coming from 'three evil forces' -- the low intensity conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir [ Images ] which can trigger a large scale conflict, the risk of a nuclear confrontation among the two nations and terrorism in South Asia. 

The Indian defence strategy has been revised in such circumstances; The 'active defence' concept has replaced the old line of passive defence, the basic 'regional deterrence' principle has been given a new meaning with 'punishment deterrence' concept taking place of the old principle of 'only deterrence'. India is stressing on taking initiatives so as to be able to conduct a hi-tech 'limited conventional war' against the enemy 'under conditions of nuclear deterrence'. 

'Looking from the angle of war objectives, India is now laying emphasis to giving China importance while treating Pakistan as lightweight, as compared to the past equal emphasis to China and Pakistan.' The write-up says that in 21st century, India has done a reassessment of the military threats coming from Pakistan and China. It considers that in Pakistan, the internal situation has become unstable, economic development has slowed down, development of military faces restrictions and the overall national strength and military capabilities show a downward trend, in comparison to the situation in India. India believes that as such, there is a weakening of real threat to it from Pakistan. 

On the other hand, in China, there is stable political situation, a fast developing economy, a continuously accelerating military modernisation drive and growing comprehensive national strength. India thinks that therefore, the potentials of 'China threat' to it are on the rise. It wants to correctly treat the dialectic relation between the changes that have occurred in military threats posed by Pakistan and China and prepare for all types of military struggles. Based on such reasoning, India has proposed the doctrine of 'two front mobile warfare'.

'In matters of strategic deployment, India has shifted to a strategy of stabilising the western front and strengthening the northern front as well as giving equal emphasis to land and sea warfare, in contrast to the earlier stress only on land warfare.' 

The Chinese scholar elaborates this theme under three points (1) in recent years, India has carried out adjustments in its defence system to suit to the new needs. 'Stabilising the western front and strengthening the northern front' is a step in this direction. India has already made plans to dispatch additional forces- two mountain divisions- to the Sino-Indian border and deploy Su-30 fighter aircraft as well as missiles there in order to further strengthen its 'partial military superiority' vis-à-vis China, sufficient to fight a 'middle or small-scale partial border war under hi-tech conditions', (2) India is increasing its deployment of mobile warfare-capable troops. Some units, on 'double combat missions', can launch mobile operations in both China and Pakistan fronts and (3) India's past attention only to land warfare is now getting shifted in the direction of the Indian Ocean, creating a deployment position capable of paying importance to both land and sea. A part of Indian troops so far located in the rear of the borders is being diverted for coastal defence purposes and a new naval fleet has come up in the south to increase strength in respect of the Indian Ocean.

'India is making efforts to create long-range mobile operational strength and gain capacity to launch cross-combat missions.' The Chinese military expert comments that structural adjustment of the Indian military is in progress with focus on building Indian Navy and Air Force as well as rapid action troops, leading to building up of global combat capability of Indian armed forces. The expert cites in this connection the war doctrines of the Indian Army [ Images ] (2004), Indian Navy (2005) and Indian Air Force (2007).

The analysis above needs to be examined together with a very recent Chinese assessment. Given under the title 'Panoramic View of International Military Situation in 2009', the analysis contributed by Ma Kang, deputy director, Institute of Strategic Studies, National Defence University, Liberation Army Daily, December 29 highlights the defence budget increases in the US, Russia [ Images ] and India. It points to India's '24 percent defence budget increase' in 2009 as compared to previous year as well as efforts to build an aircraft carrier of its own, launch of first home made submarine Arihant and goals set towards possessing 'three dimensional nuclear strategic capability.'

What stand out are the unmistakable adversarial tones with which the two highly placed Chinese experts have talked about India. Especially, the evaluation of Hao Ding runs contrary to the officially declared perceptions of India and China that each nation is not a threat to other. Observers in India have reasons to raise their eyebrows on the reappearance of the terminology 'partial border war' after some gap, more so in a contribution made by an academician close to Chinese hierarchy (the last such reference figured in an unofficial strategic affairs website in November 2008). 

Also odd is the timing of such comments when India-China bilateral defence, political and economic ties are progressing steadily -- senior Chinese military officers including the Tibet [ Images ] commander have visited India recently, the Indian defence secretary is scheduled to visit Beijing for talks, both India and China have coordinated their actions in the conference at Copenhagen on climatic change, preparations are being made by both sides for the scheduled visit this year to China by the Indian President and lastly, India-China trade volume is slated to touch $60 billion by this year.

A basic question would therefore be what is the real meaning of the latest Chinese assessment of Indian defence strategy as above, which, judging from the affiliation of the analyst concerned, can definitely be considered as reflecting official views, especially that of the military. First comes the apparent dichotomy in the thinking of the civilian and military apparatus in China on relationship with India. However, when looked carefully, the reality looks different. 

China has always been encouraging expression of strategic opinions and treating them as inputs for decision making at appropriate times. It has at the same time been taking care to see that the required diplomatic options, whether relating to India or other countries, are not prejudiced by such opinions. Specifically, this premise explains the rationale behind China's support to holding diplomatic initiatives, like talks between special representatives, to solve the boundary issue with India, while at the same time allowing hostile articulations on the subject by its strategists. 

Beijing's such two-track mindset may also be seen as setting a context for understanding the opinion expressed by the Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh [ Images ] during his recent visit to the US regarding China's 'assertiveness' vis-a-vis India of late. 

Secondly, it is probable that the analysis clearly bringing out the 'India threat' theory, albeit after a gap, has something to do with the US factor. No doubt, it makes no mention of the US, but its appearance subsequent to the issuing of US-China Joint Declaration of November 17, 2009, may have its own meaning. Undeniably, reasons seem to have arisen for Beijing to feel that a qualitative change in its favour has occurred in the triangular China-US-India relations consequent to the opening of a new foreign policy course based on a 'smart power' concept (said to be a mix of hard and soft power) by the Barack Obama [ Images ] administration. 

The US imperative towards China has undergone a shift to encompass a wider vision -- from one seeking China's emergence as a responsible stake holder in the international system to that aiming to establish a 'positive, cooperative and comprehensive relationship' in the 21st century. In addition, the US has chosen to adopt a 'pragmatic' approach on human rights issue in China. If China thinks that it has as such come to occupy a superior position in the Sino-US equation at this juncture in the background of it having emerged as America's biggest creditor, the same may not be misplaced. 

For Beijing, the same reason may hold good in believing that the US will be inclined to tone down its support to India on sensitive issues like the boundary problem and that the time is opportune to intensify its strategic pressure on India. 

Its readiness to agree with Washington to 'cooperate' on India-Pakistan issues, which touched Indian sensitivities, may relate to such thinking. It may at the same time be not wrong to assume that some Chinese pronouncements (official journal Liaowang, December 1, 2009) considering China-US and China-India relations not as a zero sum game, are only for public consumption.

Lastly, China can be expected to factor the latest views of experts in formulation of its own defence strategy vis-a-vis India. The assessment that China, not Pakistan, is India's priority military target is not going to be missed by the defence policy planners in China. But China may not need to make fresh responses. It has already consolidated its troop strength in the border, established firm defence ties with Indian ocean littorals and stepped up military help to Pakistan; On the last mentioned, Beijing's recent justification of its military aid to Pakistan as a response to India's getting arms from the US and Russia, unveils what could be in store for future. 

China's occasional talks on partial border war with India need close attention of New Delhi [ Images ] as they could be in conformity with the need expressed by China to 'win local wars under conditions of informatisation' (China's latest Defence White Paper). In a broader sense, trends in China towards enhancing its extended range force projection capabilities and establishing overseas naval bases, may have implications for the entire region, especially for countries like Japan [ Images ], India and South China sea littorals, all having territorial problems with China. 

One has only to take note of the US position that China's military modernisation is changing the balance of power in East Asia. 

China is giving mixed signals, but it would be in India's interests to continue 'engaging' China. It should at the same time take all necessary steps to protect its strategic interests; India's revised defence strategy proves that it is prepared to do the same.

National Anomaly Committee

CONFEDERATION OF CENTRAL  GOVT. EMPLOYEES & WORKERS.

http://confederationhq.blogspot.com/2009/12/national-anomaly-committee-meeting-and.html

National Anomaly Committee

Meeting and decisions.

I WONDER : WHAT ABOUT FAUJIs ??????  ANYBODY........

            The first meeting of the National Anomaly Committee was held on 12^th December, 2009. Secretary (Personnel) chaired the meeting.  On behalf of the Confederation, Com. S.K. Vyas, President and Com. K.K.N. Kutty Secretary General attended and participated in the discussion.  In the opening remark, Com. Umraomal Purohit drew the attention of the Chairman of the non-functioning of the Departmental Councils in various departments and the consequent non setting up of Departmental Anomaly Committees.  He also raised the issue of the order of the DOPT defining the term Anomaly, which was at variance with the one given in 1997.  He recalled the discussion he had with the official side in the matter when it was agreed that the definition of the term would be the same as was in the order of 1997.  Responding to the remarks made by the Staff Side Secretary, the Chairman said that his office would take steps to ensure the functioning of the JCM at all levels and informed the meeting that the National Council of the JCM would meet on 16^th January, 2009 and the notice therefore has already been issued.  On the question of anomaly, it was informed by the Chairman, that all efforts would be taken to address all questions of anomaly and resolve them.  The official side clarified that all questions of disparity in relativities would also be addressed except on  those on which the 6^th CPC has gone into and taken decision enumerating reasons.  The Chairman asked the staff Side to bring to the notice of the DOPT/DOE of all those items which stand rejected by the concerned Departmental Anomaly Committees taking shelter under the extant definition. 

            We now reproduce the items which were discussed and the decisions arrived on each of them. 

1. The item Nos. 1 to 4 and 5(iii)(iv) and 7 were grouped together and discussed as they were identical in content.  For the sake of convenience, we reproduce item No. 3 which covers all the above mentioned items.

Fixation of Pay in Revised Pay Scale

The VI CPC in para 2.2.19 (vii) has indicated that where prerevised pay scales have been merged it has been done by extending the existing minimum prescribed for the highest pay scale with which the other scales are being merged. Accordingly it has also been stipulated in 7(1) (A) of the CCS (Revised Pay) Rules, 2008 that if the minimum of the Revised Pay Band / Pay Scale is more that what is determined by multiplying the existing basic pay as on 1.1.2006 by a factor of 1.86 and rounding of the resultant figure to the next multiple of 10, the pay shall be fixed at the minimum of the revised Pay Band / Pay Scale. Note 2B below Rule 7, ibid and illustration 4B given in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Revised Pay Rule apply to cases of merger of Pay Scales.  Note 2 B states that pay in the revised Pay Bands will be fixed in the manner prescribed in accordance with Clause (A) (i) And clause (A) (ii) of Rule 7. In illustration 4B a case of an employee in the pre revised pay scale Rs.5000-8000 drawing Rs.5600 as on 1.1.2006 in the pay scale of 6500-10500 has been indicated with which the pay scale of Rs.5000-8000 stands merged.

Taking these into account the pay in the Pay Band in the case of all employees in the Pay Scales of Rs.5000-8000 and Rs.5500-9000 has to be fixed at Rs. 6500 multiplied by 1.86 i.e. Rs.12090. The fixation tables for pay scales 5000-8000 and 5500-9000may therefore be modified fixing the pay in the pay band at Rs.12090 wherever it is less than that amount.

Illustration 4B in the explanatory memorandum to the Revised Pay Rules 2008 may be modified as under:-

Existing Scale of Pay                             5000-8000

Pay Band PB-2                                    9300-34800

Merged with Pay Scale                         6500-10500

Existing Basic Pay as on 1.1.06 Rs.5600

Pay in the PB-2  Rs.5600 X 1.86 = 10420    As per Clause (A) (i) of Rule 7(i) of Revised Pay rules 2008

Pay in the PB-2  Rs.6500- X 1.86 = 12090      As per Clause (A) (ii) of Rule 7 (i) of Revised Pay Rules 2008

            Grade Pay Rs.4200

Revised Basic Pay  Rs.16290

Decision:

The Staff Side pointed out that what has been recommended by the 6^th CPC in Para 2.2.19(vii_ in respect of fixation of minimum pay in the Pay band for merged pay scales had not been taken into account while computing the pay band and the table.  After some discussion, the official side stated to have a re-look into the matter.

Item No. 5(i)

On Revised Pay Rules. 2008

(i).Option

It has been mentioned under sub rule 4 thereof that the option once exercised shall be final and should be exercised within three months from the date of notification of the rule vide Sub rule I thereof. Since it is very difficult to comprehend and assess the implication of such option, we propose that the first option exercised within three months may not be treated as final and the employees be permitted to revise the option within six month of the date of exercising the first option.

Decision.

The official side has agreed to allow another option.  The Side Side also pointed out during the discussion that the option exercised by the officials under F.R. 22(I)(A(1) on promotion has been restricted to only first promotion, which appears to be unreasonable.  The official side has agreed to examine whether the above option can be allowed to cover all promotions.

Item No. 5(ii)

(ii). Special allowance and qualification pay which are taken for fixation purposes on promotion should be doubled with effect from 1.1.2006 and not from 1.9.2008 as it cannot be construed to be an allowance. If this is not done, senior employees will suffer loss in emoluments, in case of persons who are promoted during the period between 1.1.2006 and 1.9.2008.

It was pointed out that the item relating to 5^th CPC is still pending at the Standing Committee.  The Official Side stated that the item would be covered when a decision is taken on the item relating to 5^th CPC.

Item No. 5(vi)

(vi) Rule 9. Date of next increment

It is seen after going through the stipulation in the above rules that a person whose increment falls on 1.1.2006 will get the increment on 1.1.2006 in the pre revised pay scale and will get the next increment in the revised pay structure on 1.7.2006 i.e. on expiry of six months. Similarly those, whose next increment is between 1^st July, 2006 and 1^st December, 2006 would also be granted next increment in the revised pay structure on 1.7.2006. On the other hand, the persons whose increment dates are between 1^st Feb. 2006 and 1^st June 2006 have to wait for more than 12 months to get the next increment on 1.7.2006. This is quite anomalous. In the case of those who retire during the period between 1^st Feb. and 30^th June, they will suffer a loss of one increment perpetually thus affecting their pension. It is, therefore proposed that the persons whose increment falls between 1^st February and 1^st June, 2006 may be given one increment on 1.1.2006 as a one time measure.

The official side agreed to issue orders to cover those in service between 1.1.2006 and 1.7.2006 as a one time measure.  The Staff Side however, pointed out that they have made the suggestion for a one time measure on the specific understanding that Rule 9 of the Revised Pay Rules 2008 has no applicable in the fixation of increment date in future as in those cases, the Fundamental Rules will have the application.  The Official side was of the opinion that the Revised Pay Rules will override the provisions of the Fundamental Rules.  The Staff Side then contended that the increment of an official cannot be postponed except on award of a penalty after  initiation of the disciplinary proceedings. The official side after some discussion agreed to reconsider the issue in the light of the contention made by the Staff Side. 

Item  No. 5(vii).

(vii).     Tax deduction from salary:

Spread over of the arrears of salary is permissible under section 89 (a) of the I.T. Act.  No tax will thus become payable by Group D employees on account of receipt of arrears eventually. Therefore, executive instructions may be issued not to deduct any tax from the arrears payment pertaining to the Group D employees. In respect of others, they may be allowed to exercise option to tax the arrears either on receipt basis or accrual basis.

Decision .

Since the arrears have all been paid after deduction of tax, this item was not pressed.

Item No. 5(vii)Temporary Status Casual Labourers

As per existing scheme the employees who are afforded temporary status are paid the wages computed with reference to the minimum of the corresponding scale of pay of regular employees. In the case of Group D temporary status employees, it will become necessary that they are afforded the requisite training if they are non- matriculates.

Decision.

Orders would be issued in the case of temporary status employees.  In the case of those who died /retired between 1.1.06 and 1.9.2008 grant of grade pay of Rs. 1800 without training was raised by the Staff Side.  It was agreed that the Govt. would take a decision in their case  favorably.

            Item No. 6.

Benefit on promotion.

It is an accepted proposition that an employee when promoted to a higher post involving higher responsibility should get a suitable raise in his salary. It was on this consideration that FR 22-C was framed whereby the promotee was first granted an increment in the lower Pay Scale and then fixed at the appropriate (next) stage in the higher grade.

At the time of V CPC it was agreed that minimum increase in salary on promotion shall not be less then Rs.100/- There are certain grades in which, on promotion, a hike of Rs.650/- is being allowed with reference to pre-revised pay scale.

In these circumstances grant of only one increment in the lower Pay Band / Pay scale and difference in grade pay, if there be any, being granted on promotion is certainly inadequate. We therefore propose that minimum benefit on promotion should not be less than 10% of the Pay+Grade Pay of the feeder post.

Decision:

The official side stated that the above item was not covered under the definition of anomaly.  However, after some discussion, it was agreed that the official side would further discuss the issue outside the forum  of the Anomaly Committee.

Item No. 7.

Fixation of pay on promotion.

The minimum Entry pay with Grade Pay in the revised pay structure for direct recruits appointed on or after 1.1.2006 has been specific vide first Schedule, Part –A, Section II of the Gazette Notification of the Govt. of India, Ministry of Finance No. G.S.R. 622 (E) dated 29.8.2008.

           

On promotion, the pay of the promotees should not be less than the direct recruits.

In VI CPC structure there is no pay scale and new concept of grade pay has been inducted, which should determine the status.  As such the following provisions need to be inserted below clarification 2.  'The method of Fixation of Pay on promotion on or after 1.1.2006.

"on promotion to the higher grade pay of an employee should be fixed appropriately and in any case it should not be less than the entry Pay in the revised pay structure for direct recruits appointed on of after 1.1.2006 for the post." further, on promotion to the next higher grade pay an employee should be fixed by adding 10% of pay, plus the grade pay as demanded by NC/JCM in its memorandum submitted to the Chairman, NC/JCM/Cabinet secretary on 8.4.2008.

Decision.

The Official Side agreed to issue enabling orders in the matter.

Item No. 8.

Refixation of pension/family pension.

Para 9 of the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pension's O.M. No. F.No. 38/37/08-P&PW (A) dated 1.9.2008 states as under:-

"The consolidated pension / family pension as worked out in accordance with provisions of para 4.1 above shall be treated as final basic pension with effect from 1.1.2006 and shall qualify for grant of Dearness Relief sanctioned thereafter.".

This has left uncovered the provision made in para 4.2 of the same OM, which lays down as under:-

"The fixation of pension will be subject to the provision that the revised pension in no case, shall be lower than fifty present of the minimum of the pay in the pay band plus the grade pay corresponding to the pre-revised pay scale from which the pensioner had retired. In the case of HAG + and above scales, this will be fifty percent of the minimum of the revised pay scale."

Since refixation of pension has been allowed both under paras 4.1 and 4.2, they should both he covered in para 9 of the OM.  It is requested that para 9 of the said OM may be revised including both paras 4.1 and 4.2 thereof.

Decision.

Orders have been issued vide O.M.dated 12^th and 14^th September, 2009

Item. No. 9.

Anomaly in pension for Government Servants who retired/Died in harness between 1.1.2006 and 1.9. 2006

The Sixth Central Pay Commission lays down inter-alia that once an employee renders the minimum pensionable service of 20 years, pension should be paid at 50% of the average emoluments received during the past 10 months or the pay last down, whichever is more beneficial to the retiring employee.

As per the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pension O.M. F.No. 38/37/08-P&P(W)(A) dated 2^nd September 2008, these orders shall come into force with effect from the date of issue of this OM, namely 2^nd September 2008 and shall be, applicable to all Government Servants becoming entitled to pension after rendering the minimum qualifying service of 20 years or on completion of 10 years qualifying service in accordance with rule 49(2) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972.

However, the Govt. servants who have retired on or after 1.1.2006 but before the date of issue of this OM (2.9.2008) have been debarred from this benefit. They will be governed by the rules/ orders which were in force immediately before coming into effect of these orders. In other words their pension will be calculated on average emoluments received during the last 10 months and not on the actual pay last drawn. It is requested that this discrimination should be removed.

Decision.

Orders are under issue.  The Staff Side raised the inordinate delay in fixing the revised pension and disbursement of arrears to pensioners.  The official side assured to monitor the payment of arrears to pensioners.  The refusal on the part of many banks to issue the due and drawn statement even on requisition was also brought to the notice of the Chairman.  The Director (Pension) assured that suitable instructions would be issued in this regard to all Banks.

Item No.10.

Commutation of pension.

The minimum period of service for eligibility for pension is 10 years. For appointment to Government Service the minimum age is 18 years. In view of this, if a person is appointed at the age of 18 years he cannot become eligible for pension unless he has served for a period of at least 10 years and attained the age of 28 years i.e. when his birthday falls in the 29^th years.

The table adopted a per the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pension's OM No. 38/37/08-P&PW (A) dated 2.9.2008 shows the minimum age of next birthday after retirement as 20 which is not understood. It is requested that suitable amendment to the table referred to may be notified.

The item was withdrawn by the Staff Side.

Item No.11 to 14. These items were deferred for discussion at the next meeting.

Item No.15.

Parity in pension of all pre 1996 retirees with those who retired on or after 1.1.2006

The Government have already accepted in principle that there shall be parity in pension amongst pensioners irrespective of the date from which they had retired. 

Accordingly pension of all pre 1986 retirees was revised with effect from 1.1.96 by first determining the notional pay which would have been fixed as on 1.1.86 (treating as if the employees were in service on that date) and then the Notional Pension was updated by applying the same fitment formula which was applied to serving employees.

We, therefore demanded that the notional pay of all pre 1996 retirees may be fixed as on 1.1.96 in terms of Revised Pay Rules, 1996 and the notional pension as on 1.1.96 may be revised w.e.f. 1.1.06 by applying the same fitment formula which is applied in the case of serving employees i.e. by multiplying the notional pension as on 1.1.96 by 1.86 + the Grade Pay of the Pay Scale (V CPC) from which they would have retired.

The revision of pension has been done by applying the formula of Basic Pension as on 1.1.96 + Dearness Pension (50% of Basic Pension) + Dearness Relief on Basic Pension + Dearness Pension+40% of Basic Pension.

This is not the same that has been granted to serving employees. In whose case the Grade Pay which is the fitment benefit is 40% of the maximum of the Pre-revised Pay Scale.

As such the Pensioners should also be granted 50% the of Grade Pay of the Pay Scale from which they had retired by way of fitment benefit and not 40% of Basic Pension.

Decision.

The Staff Side pointed out that the 6^th CPC in order to maintain the existing modified parity between the present and future retirees had indicated that it would be necessary to allow the same fitment benefit as is being recommended for the existing Government employees vide para 5.1.47 in page 338.  However, the Commission recommended that all past pensioners should be allowed fitment benefit equal to 40% of the basic pension. The statement and the recommendation made to give effect to the statement was at variance giving rise to anomaly and disparity in pension entitlement between the past pensioners and the future pensioners.  After detailed discussion, the official side agreed to consider the issue once again.

At the conclusion of the meeting, the Staff Side took up the matter concerning non representation of Postal Federations in the National Council as some members of a Federation which could not muster even 5% membership had been approaching one court or the other in a bid to delay the verification process and consequent recognition of the Associations and Federations in the Postal Department.  As it would be a never ending process,  the denial for the unions who had mustered more than 75% of the membership representation in the National Council would be a miscarriage of justice, the Staff Side added..  The Director (SR) of the Postal Department, who had represented the Postal Department in the official side agreed with the contention of the Staff Side and reported to the Chairman, that they had granted adhoc recognition to the Unions who had mustered the requisite membership and the Department Council had also been convened and met on adhoc basic.  The question of granting of representation to the representatives of the Staff in the National Council had been referred to the Department of Personnel and their advice in the matter was being solicited.  The Chairman assured the Staff Side to look into the matter and take appropriate decision soon.

The denial of revised higher Grade Pay to Master Craftsmen of Workshops in MMS in the Postal Department, while affording the same to those in Railways and Defence was also raised by the Staff Side.  The Department of Expenditure pointed out that they had not received any reference from the Postal Department in this matter, whereas the official side representative of the Postal Department stated that they had referred this matter to them earlier.  After some discussion, it was agreed that the Department of Expenditure and the Postal Department would sort out this matter expeditiously.

With greetings,

Yours fraternally,

K.K.N. Kutty

Secretary General

 

After recruiting sex workers, Indian Army plans ban on mobiles’ use by soldiers

FROM PAKISTAN : THE DAILY MAIL

 

http://dailymailnews.com/0110/02/FrontPage/FrontPage1.htm

NEW DELHI—As if the drive to recruiter sex workers to reduce stress and frustration level of the troops, deployed in Occupied Kashmir, was not enough, the Indian Army leadership has now decided to ban the use of mobile phones by troops to minimize their stress level, reveal the findings of The Daily Mail.
These findings indicate that senior medical officers of the Indian armed forces believe that just engaging the sex workers under the grab of female soldiers was not enough to rid the soldiers of frustration and mental stress but the use of mobile phone by troops was also a permanent source of stress and strain for the soldiers, deployed in the occupied valley.
“The problem is not the stress in the encounter, the problem is the cell phone and that should be banned,’’ said Lt-General Dipankar Ganguly, speaking on the occasion of the 246th anniversary of the Army Medical Corps here yesterday.
The top General said that cell phones allowed the soldiers to maintain regular contact with their families and get updated on their problems, which led to higher levels of stress among them.
Armed Forces Medical Services Director General Lt-Gen N K Parmar, in his observation, said that the armed forces had taken a number of steps to tackle stress-related issues among the troops. “A confidential move was made in September last by the Army High Command to minimize the level of mental stress and frustration of the soldiers posted in Kashmir,” said General N.K Parmar, referring to the move made under the recommendations of General Raj Kumar Committee, constituted by Army Chief General Deepak Kapoor.
But, as reported earlier, armed forces continue to grapple with stress-related deaths in the shape of suicide and `fragging’ (to kill a fellow soldiers) cases. In 2008, for instance, there were 151 suicide and four `fragging’ cases in the three Services.
While prolonged deployment in operations in Indian occupied part of J&K and North-East are exacting a heavy toll on the physical endurance and mental health of soldiers, they also undergo tremendous stress for not being able to take care of the problems facing their families back home. The problems could range from property disputes and harassment by anti-social elements to financial and marital problems.
Soldiers, of course, also have to grapple with paltry salaries, lack of basic amenities, ineffectual leadership, humiliation at the hands of their officers, and the constant fear of being accused of human rights violations.
It is worth mentioning here that earlier last year, in another bid to relieve the soldiers of the mental stress and sexual frustration, the Indian Army deployed around 200 prostitutes under the cover of Border Security Force’s constables in the Indian occupied Kashmir along with the Line of Control in September 2009. The decision of recruiting prostitutes for deployment in the held valley was taken in around February 2009 and Indian Army Chief General Kapoor finally approved it. This decision was taken as result of discussions and consultancies regarding the alarmingly increasing incidents of suicides and killing colleagues by soldiers of Indian army that are deployed in the Indian Occupied Kashmir to fight insurgency.
The Daily Mail’s investigations indicate that the factor of suicides and random shoot outs on colleagues by Indian soldiers in the held valley had become a big dilemma for the Indian army top brass. When this exercise gained momentum earlier this year, the army leadership approached different consultants and analysts. The consultants and analysts reached to the conclusion that Indian soldiers, deployed in the valley were committing suicides and killing colleagues out of acute frustration and depression. Medical and psychological consultants and analysts were of the view that since majority of the soldiers, deployed in the valley were married and were away from their wives for very long time, they were gripped by sexual frustrations which ultimately transformed into mental frustration.
These consultants suggested that the soldier posted in the valley should be sent on leaves to be with their wives once a month. This came as another dilemma for the Indian Army’s top brass as it was not possible at all to send such huge number of soldiers on leaves with regular intervals. The Daily Mail’s investigations further reveal that upon this a Major General was sent to Moscow to get some solution to the problems as Russians have been having some sort of similar problems around 2 decades back. This General, identified as General Kumar, returned with a very strange solution. The Russian consultants told the Indian army that the since the soldiers in the valley were women starving, they should be provided with women to meet their genuine and natural needs.
The Daily Mail’s investigations indicate that at this stage, the Indian Army Chief constituted a committee under the command of Lt.General. Raj Kumar Karwal who currently posted as Director General of a training facility of the Indian army while Major General. Sanjeev Loomba, Brigadier. Anil Sharma, Colonel. N K Khunduri and Colonel.
Sanjay Rai were members of the committee. The committee finally came up with the solution that since it was not possible to provide street whores directly to the soldier thus professional prostitutes should be recruited with title of sex workers and than they should be given basic military training and should be posted in Kashmir sector as soldiers so that the male soldiers can establish relations with them. It was also decided that the recruitment should not be made publicly but RAW’s help should be sought as RAW was having a huge network of prostitutes in different cities of India. The Daily Mail’s investigations reveal that RAW completed the assignment successfully and provided a batch of some 300, semi educated prostitutes to the General Raj Kumar committee after proper medical checkup of every individual. The committee then approached the Army Chief and it was decided that these new recruit should not be made part of mainstream army but should be adjusted in Border Security Force (BSF) and from there their services would be made available for Northern Command. The project was completed by the end of August when the new recruited batch of 300 completed a basic military training and Army Chief was informed that recruits were ready for deployment in the valley.
When contacted by The Daily Mail, Inspector General of BSF Himmat Singh confirmed that a batch of 178 female soldiers was sent to Northern Command where they were deployed along with Indo-Pak border to check the border violations by women, working in the field. Mr. Singh further stated that these women were not fully trained for operational military duties however in the next phase, after further training, they would be given the duties of operational Border security. Mr. Singh refused to admit that these female soldiers were actually prostitutes and were dispatched to the valley as undercover sex workers.

Defence Secretary to head team for Beijing dialogue

THE HINDU

 

http://www.hindu.com/2010/01/03/stories/2010010360390800.htm

As part of annual dialogue, Defence Secretary Pradeep Kumar will leave for Beijing on Tuesday for a meeting with his Chinese counterpart and discussions to carry forward the ties between the two militaries.

The Sino-Indian Defence Dialogue will be held on January 6 and 7. Mr. Kumar will lead a delegation that includes Major-General Munish Sibal from the Eastern Command and officers of the Navy and the Air Force.

“We will be sharing our perception of issues in the region and world while looking at exchange programmes between the personnel of the three services and joint exercises,” a top official in the Ministry told The Hindu.

In its 2008-09 annual report, the Ministry noted that while monitoring China’s defence modernisation and its military assistance and cooperation with Pakistan, New Delhi would engage Beijing “to seek greater transparency and openness in its defence policy and posture, while taking all necessary measures to protect the national security, territorial integrity and sovereignty of India.”

In December 2007, the Indian Army and the People’s Liberation Army of China held the first joint exercise in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency. It was held in Kunming, Yunan province, around the time when the first annual defence dialogue took place.

During December 2008, while the second annual defence dialogue was held in New Delhi, joint exercises took place in Belgaum, Karnataka.

Last year, no exercise was scheduled since China could not spare its forces. Joint exercises are expected to be held this year. 

Incursions

While New Delhi has maintained that there is no increase in the number of incursions on the Sino-Indian border, the issue is expected to figure during next week’s dialogue.

Recently, during his visit to New Delhi, the PLA Deputy Chief of General Staff, General Ge Zhen Feng, told Defence Minister A.K. Antony that the present generation of political leadership in both countries would solve the border dispute through political negotiations and dialogue.

On his part, Mr. Antony said India did not want to escalate differences and would work to strengthen cooperation in various areas to the benefit of both countries.

2 BSF Men Shot In Soura

KASHMIR OBSERVER

 

http://www.kashmirobserver.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4070:2-bsf-men-shot-in-soura&catid=15:top-news&Itemid=2

After sudden appearances in Sopore, militants struck in Srinagar today, critically injuring two BSF men in an armed attack in Soura.
The attack, the first in the new year, came even as the city remained under a security alert following militant strikes in Sopore and elsewhere in the valley.
Reports said that suspected militants opened fire on two BSF men at a close range when the latter were withdrawing cash from an ATM booth in the area.
The injured personnel, head constable Saifuddin Ahmad and constable Dhamendra Singh, were rushed to the SKIMS by the police and the paramilitary men deployed in the area, and are reported to be in a critical condition.
A police officer said that armed persons had struck without warning in Soura outskirts and injured two BSF personnel by opening fire at a close range.
Heavy contingents of the police and the paramilitary forces were rushed to the area following the attack to seal off the locality for searches.
The senior superintendent of the police (SS) for Srinagar, Javed Reyaz Bedar, said that the two personnel had come to the SKIMS for treatment, and had gone to the ATM to draw cash when they were attacked.
The SSP said that a policeman had opened retaliatory fire but that the force had exercised restraint in view of the heavy crowd.
Security in the city has been heightened further in the wake of the attack, with intensified checking of vehicles and frisking of pedestrians being taken in hand afresh.
In view of the series of attacks in Sopore in the recent past, and the sudden strike in Srinagar, intelligence agencies fear that militants had adopted a new strategy of carrying out guerrilla strikes in busy areas and getting away in the thick of the crowd.

CIVIL SERVICES : NAYE SAAL MEIN PROMOTIONS HI PROMOTIONS.....

SOURCE : WHISPERS

1. Two 1994 batch IAS officers Ajay Singh Nablyal and Kunal Sharma have been given super-time scale (GP 10000) in Uttarakhand.

2. IAS officers of three batches 1995,1996 and 1997 in Uttarakhand have been given selection-grade (GP 8700) in Uttarakhand.

3. 1997 batch IAS officers have been given Selection-Grade (GP 8700) in Chhattisgarh.

4. 10 IAS officers belonging to 1997 batch have been promoted to the selection grade (GP 8700) in Karnataka. They ARE  :- S. Selvakumar, Harsh Gupta, Amlan Aditya Biswas, C. Somasekhara, V.B. Patil, K.R. Niranjan, R. Narayanaswamy, S. Dayashankar, N. Sriraman, and K. Viswanatha Reddy.

 

5. 2006 batch Karnataka cadre IAS officers have been promoted to the senior time scale ( GP 6600) .They are Mssrs :-Thulasi Maddineni, Gurneet Tej, Salma S. Fahim, Manoj Jain, and D. Randeep.