Sunday, March 28, 2010

Ordnance Corps headless for 2 yrs


 Army Ordnance Corps (AOC), the key logistics branch responsible for weapons, ammunition and equipment, has been headless for past about two years as four of its senior most generals have been embroiled in graft cases. This is perhaps the highest number of generals from a single branch to face graft charges concurrently.
According to sources, a court of inquiry that concluded at New Delhi a few days ago, held Maj Gen GS Narula blameworthy for lapses in procurement of equipment and recommended action against him. Presided by Lt Gen P. Mohapatra, Signals Officer-in-Chief at Army Headquarters, had investigated irregularities in the procurement of items of personal clothing and personal kits for troops proceeding on UN assignments.
The inquiry had been ordered in December after Lok Sabha member Harsh Vardhan reportedly wrote to Defence Minister AK Antony earlier this year, highlighting irregularities in procurement of supplies for troops on UN missions. According to the letter, some items were procured at double the cost and the loss to the Army on this count was Rs 2.82 crore. Narula was posted as Additional Director-General (ADG) in the Ordnance Directorate at Army HQs at the time the said purchases were made. Earlier, two other Maj Generals, who had also served on the same post as Narula, have been held blameworthy by the courts of inquiries. Sources said summary of evidence (SOE) in case of Maj Gen Anil Swarup is currently underway at Jammu.
Swarup, who has been attached to the Yol-based 9 Corps, was blamed by the CoI for procuring generators, cables and boots at inflated prices. Swarup moved the Armed Forces Tribunal, challenging the proceedings against him and the case is expected to come up for hearing later this month.
The third officer, Maj Gen SP Sinha, at present posted at Chandimandir, was accused of irregularities in the purchase of general stores for the ordnance depot at Choeki. Inferior goods were allegedly bought at inflated prices.
Then there is a case of Maj Gen AK Kapur, against who the CBI filed a chargesheet for possessing assets disproportionate to known sources of income. A Maj General from the AOC has recently been approved for promotion to the rank of Lt General. There are two vacancies of Lt General in the AOC, one of Director-General Ordnance Services at Army Headquarters and the other as Commandant of the AOC Centre at Secunderabad.

Monday, March 22, 2010

1997 IAS Offrs get GP of 10000/- in Tripura

Five IAS officers of 1997 batch have been granted Super-Time Scale( GP 10000/-) in the state of Tripura. They are namely : Dilip , L Darlong, Santanu Das, Kishore Ambuly , Samarjit Bhowmik and Vijoy Debbarma. (whispers)

Saturday, March 20, 2010

Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani.......


Those who know him say he is a brooder. But those who know him well will tell you that's just one of the layers to the deeply complicated and thinking mind of Pakistan army chief Ashfaq Parvez Kayani. The bluster that marked Musharraf has been dumped for quiet gravitas as the man from Rawalpindi goes about turning friends like the US and Britain into closer allies and outmanoeuvering not-so-friendly neighbours like India and Afghanistan at international fora. In a country brought to its knees by terror, corruption and an inept political system, the former ISI chief is putting up a masterly show as he calls the shots.

Sitting with foreign minister S M Krishna this February, US defence secretary Robert Gates said he was going to Pakistan the next day. So who was he going to meet? Oh, a number of people, said Gates, but his most important conversation would be with Pakistan army chief Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani. "Why not Zardari?" asked Krishna, referring to the Pakistan president. "Because Kayani is the most important man out there," Gates said matter-of-factly . And Gates should know - in Washington, he's often described as the most powerful defence secretary Pentagon has had in a long while.

Slowly, almost imperceptibly, this low-profile general has emerged from the shadows. The obvious ineptitude of the Pakistan political establishment seems to have finally helped burnish the credentials of the Pakistan Army whose reputation was in tatters in the final days of the last military dictator, General Pervez Musharraf. And with its return has emerged its boss Kayani. Compared to Zardari's gang that just can't shoot straight, many in Pakistan seem to view the Army chief as a better bargain - although it's debatable that they'll want a return to military rule.

As boss of Pakistan's infamous spy agency ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence), Kayani had a reputation for being slightly nervous. It would now appear that he was being circumspect rather than nervous. As the civil government got its knickers in a twist every so often, the general quietly plotted the return of the military to its position of pre-eminence in Pakistan society.

He has since quietly started calling the shots. Remember how Zardari promised to send the ISI chief Shuja Pasha to India after the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, and how Kayani vetoed him? That was just the beginning of his new assertiveness.

But who is this man really? Is he a bumbling military brass in the mould of Yahya Khan, who lost East Pakistan because of his ham-handed ways, or is he a modern-day version of the suave Ayub Khan, Pakistan's first military dictator who introduced the army to the intoxication of political power? Or is Kayani just a product of circumstances, the man who is willy-nilly filling up the political vacuum created by the messy management of Zardari & Co?

Details about the 57-year-old Kayani are somewhat sketchy. He doesn't have the kind of privileged background that most Pakistan military brass does. His father, Lehrasab, was a naib subedar in the army - in other words, a non-commissioned officer. Born in Rawalpindi in Punjab, Kayani came up the hard way after being commissioned in 1971, the year of the Bangladesh War.

Those who have seen him up close say Kayani is the brooding type. He was given to long, solitary walks until November 2007, when Gen Musharraf named him the army chief - thereafter, it was no longer possible for him to remain unattended. Kayani is a chain smoker - he reportedly lights up every 15 minutes - and is given to long drags on his cigarette as he engages in deep listening during briefings by his trusted commanders. It's said he interrupts only to seek either a clarification or elucidation of a point.

Kayani's slightly unnerving silence contrasts strongly with Musharraf's volubility. But it would be stupid to infer from this that he has little to say. They say Kayani has a lot more going on in his head. He is also a Pakistan army "traditionalist" which means his worldview is India-centric . The eastern neighbour, India, is seen by the army as enemy No1, and policies and responses flow from that basic understanding.

A strategically shrewd army chief, Kayani doesn't count India among Pakistan's allies - something that is likely to make him appear in New Delhi to be more dangerous than someone like Musharraf. In any case, since it's Kayani who holds the reins, New Delhi would do well to sit up and take notice of this man.

It needs to know whether Kayani's anti-India stance is a strategic move to bind together the army at a time when political parties in Pakistan are slipping fast into an inchoate body of disparate noises, and when the people see the solidity of the army as a source of reassurance. Or is it genetically coded - that come what may, he will be hostile towards India.

Says a top Indian official, "On a scale of 1 to 10 for anti-India sentiment, if Musharraf was at 5, Kayani is at 8." "And as he is seen increasingly to be in control, it's bad news for us."

Kayani started out as an apolitical army chief. Now as he is in the driving seat in Pakistan, he is showing political sense. The way he has latched on to the water issue between India and Pakistan to drum up paranoia about India "starving" Pakistan of water shows he knows how to press the emotive buttons. When India offered foreign secretary-level talks with Pakistan, Islamabad took its time to respond, allegedly because Kayani hadn't given his nod; he wanted a composite dialogue that would include Kashmir, and not just terror. And it was Kayani who gave directions to Pakistan's foreign secretary, Salman Bashir, when he came to New Delhi to meet Nirupama Rao.

Significantly, the day before, Kayani told the defence committee of the National Assembly that the army under him would remain "India-centric" . "India has the capability, intentions can change overnight," he told legislators.

G Parthasarathy, who was high commissioner to Islamabad, says, "Gen Kayani represents an institutional hostility towards India because promoting it enables the army to dominate Pakistan without responsibility. Given the fact that he is the de facto ruler of Pakistan, India should be prepared for more covert and overt hostility directed at it from Pakistani soil."

The quiet rise of Kayani hasn't gone unnoticed in capitals around the world. US secretary of state Hillary Clinton spends more time with Kayani than with the civvies. Afghan president Hamid Karzai, who has had a testy relationship with the Pakistani army, is mending fences with it. Pakistan's strategic outreach is being managed by Kayani: He made a much talked about power-point presentation at the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) headquarters in Brussels on how he could help the West get out of Afghanistan; he talked turkey with the Turks on keeping control of a key conference in Istanbul on Afghanistan's future; and he's assumed the role of the point person on 'reconciliation' with Taliban.

This week, Kayani will be the pre-eminent member of the Pakistan delegation at a strategic dialogue with Washington where demand No.1 will be a nuclear deal like the one signed with India, apart from agreements on more mundane matters like trade and agriculture. In preparation for the talks, Kayani presided over a meeting of government secretaries on Tuesday, the first time that top-level bureaucrats have been called to army headquarters in a civilian regime.

It was not always so, even as recently as in 2009. Through most of last year, Pakistan, and its army, were on the back foot. Terrorists in Swat and other parts of FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) and NWFP (North-West Frontier Province) were on the rampage and inching towards Islamabad, setting off alarm bells the world over. To make matters worse, there was talk of the army playing fast and loose with the Americans as well as with the Taliban. The US media was awash with CIA leaks on how Kayani had described Afghan Taliban leader Sirajuddin Haqqani as a 'strategic asset'.

There was little trust between the two sides.

Cut to January 2010, and the scenario had changed dramatically. Pakistan had 'fixed' the trust problem with the Americans. In July 2008, when Kayani and ISI chief Shuja Pasha were 'summoned' by General David Petraeus, head of the US Central Command, to be scolded about Islamabad's misdemeanors, especially the attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul, it was a low point for a country which had tomtommed its "shared anxieties'' with America.

By the end of 2009, Kayani was taking the US joint chief of staff chairman Mike Mullen and US commander in Afghanistan Stanley Mc-Crystal on helicopter rides in Swat and Waziristan to show progress in his battle against the Taliban. Pakistan had effectively re-established itself in the West as a part of the solution, even as it continued to be a part of the problem.

Kayani's message to the NATO brass in January, made adroitly yet forcefully through a 62-slide presentation, was disarmingly simple: Pakistan had a strategic future in Afghanistan well beyond the US presence and should not be taken lightly. This meant the government in Kabul had to be mindful of Pakistani interests; and India had to be out of Afghanistan, or at the very least, needed to greatly reduce its presence.

Kayani scored another big victory at the January 28 London conference on the future of Afghanistan. The idea promoted by the British and backed by the US, that Pakistan would be the lead player in the Taliban 'reconciliation' process, was met with enthusiastic response. The army chief came out smelling of roses, confident in his belief that he had successfully outmanoeuvered India even as New Delhi fumbled in its opposition to the Taliban being accommodated.

This was quite a contrast to Musharraf's last days, when the army stumbled from one political miscalculation to another and ended up with the disastrous storming of Islamabad's Lal Masjid where radical imams were threatening the state. Meanwhile, the Tehreek-e-Taliban was growing in strength and firepower with a string of terror attacks throughout Pakistan, leading up to the assassination of Benazir Bhutto.

Worryingly for the hawks, Musharraf had also found a common language with Manmohan Singh and back-channel talks with India hinted at some sort of non-territorial adjustment in Kashmir. His 'out-of-the-box' proposals on Kashmir as well as 'tactical restraint' on the Kashmir jihad between 2004 and 2007 undermined the traditional mindset. As both Siachen and Sir Creek remained unresolved, there rose many voices within the Pakistan military establishment questioning the wisdom of abandoning the old position of bleeding India.

Enter Kayani, with a 18-handicap in golf and a Plan. Admiral Mullen recently gushed in Time magazine: "Gen Kayani commands an army with troops fighting in what President Barack Obama has rightly called the 'most dangerous place in the world.' He's lost more than 1,000 soldiers in that fight. He knows the stakes. He's got a plan."

Convinced of the centrality of the army as the bulwark of the Pakistan state, Kayani was bringing back to it its robbed glory and quintessential values. He has figured that the only way to regain influence for Pakistan would be to somehow make the Taliban a part of the power structure in Kabul and help the US pack its bags. That would force India to leave Afghanistan and help Pakistan regain control of the region.

Until that happens, Kayani knows the India bogey has to be kept alive and leveraged against Pakistan's efforts at taming the Taliban. Against the US's better judgment, but impelled by recession and public opinion, Washington is giving the Kayani worldview more than a nod and a wink. Washington's approach to Islamabad is old-fashioned bribery: sophisticated military toys are winging their way to Pakistan as 'incentive' to fight the Taliban.

It knows full well that these weapons will actually be directed against India. As an Indian official explained, "Kayani is pegging the modernisation of the Pak army on US money." By end-2010 , Pakistan will get an additional $3.4 billion in military aid from the US, bringing the total up to almost $12 billion since 2003.

Kayani cut his teeth in the army during the Bangladesh war. Thirty years later as director-general military operations (DGMO), he directed the 10-month stand-off with the Indian army. He earned his spurs with Musharraf when he conducted, with efficiency and confidentiality, the investigation into the assassination bids on Musharraf in 2003. Musharraf has himself reminisced that until Kayani took over, the investigation was a mess. It led to his appointment as DG-ISI in 2004.

Revision Of Pay Scales


No.AB.14017/61/2008-Estt. (RR)
Government of India
Ministry of Personnel, P.G. & Pensions
(Department of Personnel & Training)
New Delhi
Dated, the 12th March, 2010.
Subject:-     Sixth Central Pay Commission's recommendations - revision of pay scales - amendment of Service Rules / Recruitment Rules
        The undersigned is directed to invite reference to this Department's OM of even number dated 24th March, 2009 on the above subject.
2.    In the Annexure to the said OM, the entries pertaining to the following grades may be revised as under:-
Sl. No.      From       To          Minimum qualifying service
    1.          1800     1900                     3 Years
    25.        10000   HAG                    3 Years
    26.        HAG     HAG + Scale      1 Year
    27.        HAG     Apex Scale         2 years
3. Hindi version will follow.
(J.A. Vaidyanathan)
Deputy Secretary to the Government of India

Upgradation on anvil.....


50 per cent posts of Chief Commissioners in the Central Board of Excise & Customs (CBEC) will soon be put in the higher pay scale of Rs.75000 to Rs. 79000.

Thursday, March 18, 2010

Eastern Army Cdr

Lt Gen Bikram Singh is likely to take over as new army cdr eastern command.

Tuesday, March 16, 2010

Women Officers in Army


The present strength of women officers is 1012 in the Army (excluding Army Medical Corps, Army Dental Corps and Military Nursing Service). Twelve women officers in the Army are due to retire in 2010 after 14 years of service. As per the present policy, the tenure of both women and men Short Service Commissioned Officers is ten years extendable upto 14 years. Both women and men are inducted in the Short Service Commission in the Army. Women officers serving in the Army are entitled to the same benefits as available to similarly placed men officers. However, women SSC officers are not eligible for being considered for grant of Permanent Commission in all Branches. Permanent Commission to SSC (Women) officers have been granted prospectively in Judge Advocate General (JAG) Department and Army Education Corps (AEC) of Army. Women officers in the Indian Army are not assigned to the combat arms. A study carried out by HQrs Integrated Defence Staff in 2006 on all aspects of employment of women officers in the armed forces, recommended exclusion of women officers from close combat roles.

            The number of cases of alleged exploitation/harassment of women officers in the Armed Forces reported during the last three years, service wise is as follows:

Total number of cases
Punished awarded
Disciplinary proceedings/court of inquiry/general court martial are in progress
Complaint found baseless
Air Force

            Some of the important actions taken to check recurrence of sexual harassment cases are as under:
(i)                   Orders have been issued on definition of sexual harassment and procedure to deal with such complaints.
(ii)                 Instructions have been issued emphasising ‘Zero Tolerance’ towards sexual harassment cases.
This information was given by Defence Minister Shri AK Antony in separate written replies to Smt Yashodhara Raje Scindia and Shri Rakesh Sachan in Lok Sabha today.

Friday, March 12, 2010

DA Incr....

DA wef 01 Jan 2010 is going to be 35%, an increase of 8% over the existing rate of 27%. The increase is likely to be declared soon.

women power....


In a landmark judgment, the Indian Air Force has been ordered to  grant permanent commission to women officers.

A group of women officers  had approached the court to get equal rights with male officers.

They will now get permanent commission on completion of their fixed tenure of 15 years, along with financial benefits. 

It should be pointed out that permanent commission does not mean that women will be given an opportunity to serve in the fighting arms - this is a decision which has still not been taken.  Women who work as medical officers have been entitled to full tenure in the past, but women pilots and officers  serving in areas like  Administration, Logistics, Air Traffic, Engineering and were granted only a 15 year term.



Lieutenant General SN Handa will take over as the Director General of Infantry of the Indian Army tomorrow.Commissioned on November 14, 1971 into the 5th Battalion of the 3rd Gorkha Rifles on the eve of the Indo-Pak War of 1971, the General has served along the borders of the country from Rajasthan and Punjab in the West to Jammu and Kashmir in the North, Himachal-Tibet Border in the Centre and Sikkim, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh in the East.
He commanded his battalion at Dera Baba Nanak in Punjab at the peak of militancy in the state from 1990-93. He has also commanded a brigade during Op Parakram.

Thursday, March 11, 2010

Do You Know....

The PVC was established on 26 January 1950, by the President of India, with effect from 15 August 1947, and presently it is the second highest award of the Government of India, after the Bharat Ratna . This amendment in the statute was done on 26 January 1980.

Wednesday, March 10, 2010

SC relief to officers over pay anomalies



Ruling that rank pay forms part of basic salary, the Supreme Court, in a significant decision affecting thousands of armed forces personnel, granted arrears arising out of anomalies in the fixation of pay consequent to the Fourth Pay Commission.
Upholding an earlier High Court ruling, the apex court has also ordered that interest at the rate of 6 per cent be paid on the arrears. The Fourth Pay Commission recommendations were implemented with effect from January 1, 1986.
Legal experts are of the opinion that this would require re-fixation of pay based on the Fourth and in some cases Fifth Pay Commission. Though the calculation of the exact amount of arrears could be a time consuming and tedious exercise, some officers estimate that they could amount from several thousand rupees to a few lakh rupees, depending upon the rank and length of reckonable service of an individual.
After the Fourth Pay Commission, an integrated pay scale of Rs 2,300-5,100 was implemented for officers from the rank of second lieutenant to brigadier. In addition, rank pay ranging from Rs 200 to Rs 1,200 was authorised to officers from the rank of captain to brigadier, which was to be added into the basic pay for all intents and purposes.
However, while fixing the pay in the new scales, an amount equal to the rank pay was deducted from the emoluments resulting in financial loss to all affected officers. Hence all officers holding the rank of captain to brigadier as on January 1986 suffered cumulative losses.
Deciding a case filed by Maj AK Dhanapalan, the Kerala High Court had termed this deduction of rank pay as illegal. An SLP filed by the Union government against this order was also dismissed, though not on merits but on technical grounds of limitation.
Soon thereafter, many similar petitions were filed in various high courts all over the country. These were clubbed together and transferred to the Supreme Court to be heard along with an SLP of similar nature that had arisen out of a case that was allowed on the basis of the judgement in Dhalapalan’s case.
The Supreme Court yesterday upheld the judgement in Dhalapalan’s case, delivered in 1998, and the apex court granted relief to all similarly placed officers. Some officers had also contended that incorrect fixation for pay in 1986 also had an adverse effect in pay fixation during subsequent pay commissions.
A large number of veterans and ex-servicemen’s organisations had also written to the defence minister and the prime minister in this regard. In their letters to the government, some veterans had estimated that about 40,000 to 50,000 officers, both serving and retired including widows would be directly affected. 

Sunday, March 7, 2010

Military Murphy's Laws


MY FAVORITE FOR THE PROFESSIONAL INDIAN ARMY : "Professionals are predictable, its the amateurs that are dangerous."

1. Friendly fire - isn't.
2. Recoilless rifles - aren't.
3. Suppressive fires - won't.
4. You are not Superman; Marines and fighter pilots take note.
5. A sucking chest wound is Nature's way of telling you to slow down.
6. If it's stupid but it works, it isn't stupid.
7. Try to look unimportant; the enemy may be low on ammo and not want to waste a bullet on you.
8. If at first you don't succeed, call in an air strike.
9. If you are forward of your position, your artillery will fall short.
10. Never share a foxhole with anyone braver than yourself.
11. Never go to bed with anyone crazier than yourself.
12. Never forget that your weapon was made by the lowest bidder.
13. If your attack is going really well, it's an ambush.
14. The enemy diversion you're ignoring is their main attack.
15. The enemy invariably attacks on two occasions:
      a. When they're ready.
      b. When you're not.
16. No OPLAN ever survives initial contact.
17. There is no such thing as a perfect plan.
18. Five second fuses always burn three seconds.
19. There is no such thing as an atheist in a foxhole.
20. A retreating enemy is probably just falling back and regrouping.
21. The important things are always simple; the simple are always hard.
22. The easy way is always mined.
23. Teamwork is essential; it gives the enemy other people to shoot at.
24. Don't look conspicuous; it draws fire. For this reason, it is not at all uncommon for aircraft carriers to be known as bomb magnets.
25. Never draw fire; it irritates everyone around you.


Wednesday, March 3, 2010



Officer Intake hits new low:

Tuesday, March 2, 2010

Promotions IPS...

Eight 1996 batch IPS officers have been promoted to the rank of DIG in Andhra Pradesh. They are Mssrs S Bagchi, Charu Sinha, Anil Kumar,  VC Sajjanar,  N Sanjay, Ms Bhavana Saxena, Naveen Chand and  Surya Prakash.

Monday, March 1, 2010



The Indian Army’s results for the promotion of officers to the rank of full Colonel are out. The good news is that more than fifty per cent of infantry and artillery Lieutenant Colonels from the batch of 1994 will get their red collar dogs, with the increase in the number of vacancies due to the AV Singh committee’s recommendations. 55 per cent of the artillery officers and 53 per cent of the infantry officers under scrutiny have been promoted to the rank of Colonel.

Officers from the armored and mechanized infantry have not, however, benefited much from these recommendations because of the comparatively smaller number of vacancies available at the rank of Colonel. Less than 40 per cent of the 1993-batch armored officers under consideration have been approved.

While in infantry regiments there is a ratio of 21 junior officers to a Colonel, in armored regiments the proportion is roughly 26 junior officers to a Colonel.

Significantly, across all the arms and services, all officers having attended Technical Staff College courses at the Institute of Armament Technology in Pune have been approved for promotion. Also, more than 90 per cent of the infantry and artillery officers who have passed staff college courses at the Defense Services Staff College in Wellington have been promoted, with the figure swelling to 100 per cent in the case of armored officers.

The purpose of the AV Singh committee’s recommendations was to effect a general reduction in the age of the commanding officers of the units of the fighting arms.

But while this result has shown an increase in the number of officers getting promoted, there is still dissatisfaction at the number of officers who can no longer hope for further promotion. “Half the number of army officers still find their career progression blocked. In contrast to civil and police service officers, the army will still be a dead-end for many Lieutenant Colonels,” said one officer, who did not wish to be named, as he was not authorized to speak on this issue.
The percentage of Lieutenant Colonels promoted is only in the context of the existing officer strength of the Indian Army. This percentage would be diluted, and fall, if the army were to achieve its sanctioned officer strength of more than 45,000.