1. About 72 IPS officers of the 1996 batch have been approved for the rank of DIG.
2. 1990 batch IAS Officers file for promotion to the rank of Joint Secretary (= Maj Gen ) in the Government of India is believed to have been cleared by the govt.
Monday, April 12, 2010
Army plans sub-area headquarter in Jagdalpur
INDIAN EXPRESS
I WONDER : DEEDS SOW THE SEEDS.
The Indian Army’s footprint in the Naxal-infested states of Chhattisgarh and Orissa is all set to increase with an already approved sub-area level headquarter, headed by a Brigadier, coming up shortly at Jagdalpur, another being proposed at Ambarda on the Orissa-West Bengal border and the proposed shifting of the special forces training school from Nahan in Himachal Pradesh to Chakarbhata near Raipur.
Top government sources told The Indian Express that after the Maoist attack on CRPF personnel in Dantewada on April 6, Home Secretary G K Pillai called on Army Chief General V K Singh in South Block and discussed the prospects of synergy between the paramilitary forces and the Army in the fight against the Naxals.
Among the points discussed at the meeting were:
• Paramilitary forces should send homogenous companies of personnel for four-six week induction training with the Army, to infuse camaraderie among the forces. Anti-insurgency operations are group tasks, not individual operations.
• Home and Defence Ministries to sort out the problem of who is going to provide administrative arrangements to the security forces during the induction training. The paramilitary forces say that the Army wants them to make administrative arrangements for trainees.
• Each paramilitary company involved in anti-Naxal duties should identify personnel who could be trained as intelligence scouts so that local intelligence is developed by the forces themselves rather than relying on the state or Intelligence Bureau for every small issue.
• Anti-Naxal operations should be discretely done as there is a serious possibility of sabotage or interception of communication from Maoist sympathisers.
While the government has kept its option open on getting the Army involved in anti-Naxal operations, the military top brass has decided to make its presence felt in the red zone of Central India. The basic idea is to sensitise its own men in the area in case called upon to do the duty.
As a first step, a sub-area level headquarter is going to come up in Jagdalpur in the next six months, while the Orissa government has already offered land for another sub-area headquarter at Ambarda, south of west Midnapore in West Bengal.
However, the most significant development is the proposed shifting of the special forces training school from Nahan to Chakarbhata near Raipur with the Raman Singh government willing to offer nearly 2,700 acres of land with an airport for airborne operations to the Army. The first step in this direction was taken during the visit of then Army Chief General Deepak Kapoor to Chhattisgarh in March 2009.
While the finer details of handing over the airport to the Army are being sorted out between the Defence Ministry and the Civil Aviation Ministry, the Army’s presence will bring not only development but also security to the region apart from on-the-ground training to the paramilitary forces.
The Indian Army’s footprint in the Naxal-infested states of Chhattisgarh and Orissa is all set to increase with an already approved sub-area level headquarter, headed by a Brigadier, coming up shortly at Jagdalpur, another being proposed at Ambarda on the Orissa-West Bengal border and the proposed shifting of the special forces training school from Nahan in Himachal Pradesh to Chakarbhata near Raipur.
Top government sources told The Indian Express that after the Maoist attack on CRPF personnel in Dantewada on April 6, Home Secretary G K Pillai called on Army Chief General V K Singh in South Block and discussed the prospects of synergy between the paramilitary forces and the Army in the fight against the Naxals.
Among the points discussed at the meeting were:
• Paramilitary forces should send homogenous companies of personnel for four-six week induction training with the Army, to infuse camaraderie among the forces. Anti-insurgency operations are group tasks, not individual operations.
• Home and Defence Ministries to sort out the problem of who is going to provide administrative arrangements to the security forces during the induction training. The paramilitary forces say that the Army wants them to make administrative arrangements for trainees.
• Each paramilitary company involved in anti-Naxal duties should identify personnel who could be trained as intelligence scouts so that local intelligence is developed by the forces themselves rather than relying on the state or Intelligence Bureau for every small issue.
• Anti-Naxal operations should be discretely done as there is a serious possibility of sabotage or interception of communication from Maoist sympathisers.
While the government has kept its option open on getting the Army involved in anti-Naxal operations, the military top brass has decided to make its presence felt in the red zone of Central India. The basic idea is to sensitise its own men in the area in case called upon to do the duty.
As a first step, a sub-area level headquarter is going to come up in Jagdalpur in the next six months, while the Orissa government has already offered land for another sub-area headquarter at Ambarda, south of west Midnapore in West Bengal.
However, the most significant development is the proposed shifting of the special forces training school from Nahan to Chakarbhata near Raipur with the Raman Singh government willing to offer nearly 2,700 acres of land with an airport for airborne operations to the Army. The first step in this direction was taken during the visit of then Army Chief General Deepak Kapoor to Chhattisgarh in March 2009.
While the finer details of handing over the airport to the Army are being sorted out between the Defence Ministry and the Civil Aviation Ministry, the Army’s presence will bring not only development but also security to the region apart from on-the-ground training to the paramilitary forces.
Dantewada incident.
I WONDER : Thought for the day "More people would learn from their mistakes if they weren't so busy denying them. "
Three factors could have led to the Dantewada incident. First, lack of coordination and cooperation between the CRPF and the state police. There is a complete lack of understanding between the two — the state police complains about the central forces while the CRPF has reservation about the state police.
Second, if 1,000 Naxals were part of the attack, Chhattisgarh Police should have provided intelligence. There is enough information in the states, but the question is how much of the information is shared. The third factor is complacency on the part of the CRPF; they did not follow standard operating procedures.
It is a well-known fact that in these areas one should not take the beaten track. One is not supposed to use vehicles on the beaten track as it is mined, you must move on foot, as it is less dangerous. The maximum casualties happened due to the explosion. You can only blame the leader for this kind of a situation. Even home minister P Chidambaram said something had horribly gone wrong.
The CRPF was not following standard operating procedures; they were casual and nonchalant. The problem is that there is a tendency to opt for the easy way. I have this uncomfortable feeling that one reason for this is the tremendous expansion of the CRPF. They have increased intake, and you can get manpower given the levels of unemployment. But you need to equip, train and motivate these men. The home ministry should see if the CRPF has the right training. You need to have pre-induction training before sending them to the battlefield.
The state police should bear the brunt. In Punjab, the tide turned after the police took on the terrorists head on. The CRPF, the BSF and the Indian Army play a supporting role. The state police are sons of soil; they know the terrain, the language. They must be motivated, given training and the right kind of equipment. The state police need to be raised to a level to take the Naxals head on. West Bengal, Jharkhand and Bihar have been lukewarm; they have been reluctant partners. The CRPF when deployed gets battalion from all over, and they have no knowledge of the terrain or the local language.
Second, if 1,000 Naxals were part of the attack, Chhattisgarh Police should have provided intelligence. There is enough information in the states, but the question is how much of the information is shared. The third factor is complacency on the part of the CRPF; they did not follow standard operating procedures.
It is a well-known fact that in these areas one should not take the beaten track. One is not supposed to use vehicles on the beaten track as it is mined, you must move on foot, as it is less dangerous. The maximum casualties happened due to the explosion. You can only blame the leader for this kind of a situation. Even home minister P Chidambaram said something had horribly gone wrong.
The CRPF was not following standard operating procedures; they were casual and nonchalant. The problem is that there is a tendency to opt for the easy way. I have this uncomfortable feeling that one reason for this is the tremendous expansion of the CRPF. They have increased intake, and you can get manpower given the levels of unemployment. But you need to equip, train and motivate these men. The home ministry should see if the CRPF has the right training. You need to have pre-induction training before sending them to the battlefield.
The state police should bear the brunt. In Punjab, the tide turned after the police took on the terrorists head on. The CRPF, the BSF and the Indian Army play a supporting role. The state police are sons of soil; they know the terrain, the language. They must be motivated, given training and the right kind of equipment. The state police need to be raised to a level to take the Naxals head on. West Bengal, Jharkhand and Bihar have been lukewarm; they have been reluctant partners. The CRPF when deployed gets battalion from all over, and they have no knowledge of the terrain or the local language.
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