1. About 72 IPS officers of the 1996 batch have been approved for the rank of DIG.
2. 1990 batch IAS Officers file for promotion to the rank of Joint Secretary (= Maj Gen ) in the Government of India is believed to have been cleared by the govt.
Monday, April 12, 2010
Army plans sub-area headquarter in Jagdalpur
INDIAN EXPRESS
I WONDER : DEEDS SOW THE SEEDS.
The Indian Army’s footprint in the Naxal-infested states of Chhattisgarh and Orissa is all set to increase with an already approved sub-area level headquarter, headed by a Brigadier, coming up shortly at Jagdalpur, another being proposed at Ambarda on the Orissa-West Bengal border and the proposed shifting of the special forces training school from Nahan in Himachal Pradesh to Chakarbhata near Raipur.
Top government sources told The Indian Express that after the Maoist attack on CRPF personnel in Dantewada on April 6, Home Secretary G K Pillai called on Army Chief General V K Singh in South Block and discussed the prospects of synergy between the paramilitary forces and the Army in the fight against the Naxals.
Among the points discussed at the meeting were:
• Paramilitary forces should send homogenous companies of personnel for four-six week induction training with the Army, to infuse camaraderie among the forces. Anti-insurgency operations are group tasks, not individual operations.
• Home and Defence Ministries to sort out the problem of who is going to provide administrative arrangements to the security forces during the induction training. The paramilitary forces say that the Army wants them to make administrative arrangements for trainees.
• Each paramilitary company involved in anti-Naxal duties should identify personnel who could be trained as intelligence scouts so that local intelligence is developed by the forces themselves rather than relying on the state or Intelligence Bureau for every small issue.
• Anti-Naxal operations should be discretely done as there is a serious possibility of sabotage or interception of communication from Maoist sympathisers.
While the government has kept its option open on getting the Army involved in anti-Naxal operations, the military top brass has decided to make its presence felt in the red zone of Central India. The basic idea is to sensitise its own men in the area in case called upon to do the duty.
As a first step, a sub-area level headquarter is going to come up in Jagdalpur in the next six months, while the Orissa government has already offered land for another sub-area headquarter at Ambarda, south of west Midnapore in West Bengal.
However, the most significant development is the proposed shifting of the special forces training school from Nahan to Chakarbhata near Raipur with the Raman Singh government willing to offer nearly 2,700 acres of land with an airport for airborne operations to the Army. The first step in this direction was taken during the visit of then Army Chief General Deepak Kapoor to Chhattisgarh in March 2009.
While the finer details of handing over the airport to the Army are being sorted out between the Defence Ministry and the Civil Aviation Ministry, the Army’s presence will bring not only development but also security to the region apart from on-the-ground training to the paramilitary forces.
The Indian Army’s footprint in the Naxal-infested states of Chhattisgarh and Orissa is all set to increase with an already approved sub-area level headquarter, headed by a Brigadier, coming up shortly at Jagdalpur, another being proposed at Ambarda on the Orissa-West Bengal border and the proposed shifting of the special forces training school from Nahan in Himachal Pradesh to Chakarbhata near Raipur.
Top government sources told The Indian Express that after the Maoist attack on CRPF personnel in Dantewada on April 6, Home Secretary G K Pillai called on Army Chief General V K Singh in South Block and discussed the prospects of synergy between the paramilitary forces and the Army in the fight against the Naxals.
Among the points discussed at the meeting were:
• Paramilitary forces should send homogenous companies of personnel for four-six week induction training with the Army, to infuse camaraderie among the forces. Anti-insurgency operations are group tasks, not individual operations.
• Home and Defence Ministries to sort out the problem of who is going to provide administrative arrangements to the security forces during the induction training. The paramilitary forces say that the Army wants them to make administrative arrangements for trainees.
• Each paramilitary company involved in anti-Naxal duties should identify personnel who could be trained as intelligence scouts so that local intelligence is developed by the forces themselves rather than relying on the state or Intelligence Bureau for every small issue.
• Anti-Naxal operations should be discretely done as there is a serious possibility of sabotage or interception of communication from Maoist sympathisers.
While the government has kept its option open on getting the Army involved in anti-Naxal operations, the military top brass has decided to make its presence felt in the red zone of Central India. The basic idea is to sensitise its own men in the area in case called upon to do the duty.
As a first step, a sub-area level headquarter is going to come up in Jagdalpur in the next six months, while the Orissa government has already offered land for another sub-area headquarter at Ambarda, south of west Midnapore in West Bengal.
However, the most significant development is the proposed shifting of the special forces training school from Nahan to Chakarbhata near Raipur with the Raman Singh government willing to offer nearly 2,700 acres of land with an airport for airborne operations to the Army. The first step in this direction was taken during the visit of then Army Chief General Deepak Kapoor to Chhattisgarh in March 2009.
While the finer details of handing over the airport to the Army are being sorted out between the Defence Ministry and the Civil Aviation Ministry, the Army’s presence will bring not only development but also security to the region apart from on-the-ground training to the paramilitary forces.
Dantewada incident.
I WONDER : Thought for the day "More people would learn from their mistakes if they weren't so busy denying them. "
Three factors could have led to the Dantewada incident. First, lack of coordination and cooperation between the CRPF and the state police. There is a complete lack of understanding between the two — the state police complains about the central forces while the CRPF has reservation about the state police.
Second, if 1,000 Naxals were part of the attack, Chhattisgarh Police should have provided intelligence. There is enough information in the states, but the question is how much of the information is shared. The third factor is complacency on the part of the CRPF; they did not follow standard operating procedures.
It is a well-known fact that in these areas one should not take the beaten track. One is not supposed to use vehicles on the beaten track as it is mined, you must move on foot, as it is less dangerous. The maximum casualties happened due to the explosion. You can only blame the leader for this kind of a situation. Even home minister P Chidambaram said something had horribly gone wrong.
The CRPF was not following standard operating procedures; they were casual and nonchalant. The problem is that there is a tendency to opt for the easy way. I have this uncomfortable feeling that one reason for this is the tremendous expansion of the CRPF. They have increased intake, and you can get manpower given the levels of unemployment. But you need to equip, train and motivate these men. The home ministry should see if the CRPF has the right training. You need to have pre-induction training before sending them to the battlefield.
The state police should bear the brunt. In Punjab, the tide turned after the police took on the terrorists head on. The CRPF, the BSF and the Indian Army play a supporting role. The state police are sons of soil; they know the terrain, the language. They must be motivated, given training and the right kind of equipment. The state police need to be raised to a level to take the Naxals head on. West Bengal, Jharkhand and Bihar have been lukewarm; they have been reluctant partners. The CRPF when deployed gets battalion from all over, and they have no knowledge of the terrain or the local language.
Second, if 1,000 Naxals were part of the attack, Chhattisgarh Police should have provided intelligence. There is enough information in the states, but the question is how much of the information is shared. The third factor is complacency on the part of the CRPF; they did not follow standard operating procedures.
It is a well-known fact that in these areas one should not take the beaten track. One is not supposed to use vehicles on the beaten track as it is mined, you must move on foot, as it is less dangerous. The maximum casualties happened due to the explosion. You can only blame the leader for this kind of a situation. Even home minister P Chidambaram said something had horribly gone wrong.
The CRPF was not following standard operating procedures; they were casual and nonchalant. The problem is that there is a tendency to opt for the easy way. I have this uncomfortable feeling that one reason for this is the tremendous expansion of the CRPF. They have increased intake, and you can get manpower given the levels of unemployment. But you need to equip, train and motivate these men. The home ministry should see if the CRPF has the right training. You need to have pre-induction training before sending them to the battlefield.
The state police should bear the brunt. In Punjab, the tide turned after the police took on the terrorists head on. The CRPF, the BSF and the Indian Army play a supporting role. The state police are sons of soil; they know the terrain, the language. They must be motivated, given training and the right kind of equipment. The state police need to be raised to a level to take the Naxals head on. West Bengal, Jharkhand and Bihar have been lukewarm; they have been reluctant partners. The CRPF when deployed gets battalion from all over, and they have no knowledge of the terrain or the local language.
Tuesday, April 6, 2010
Soldier, heal thyself
BUSINESS STANDARD
I WONDER : I SAID IT EARLIER TOO THE COAS HAS DIAGNOSED THE DISEASE CORRECTLY BUT HE NEEDS TO KNOW THE CAUSE AND ELIMINATE THAT.....
Figuring out the state of an army’s morale is easy. All it takes is a couple of drinks with two groups of people: the officers and the enlisted men. If the chatter is mainly about sports and professional competitions, ongoing training and about how much tougher and smarter they are than their rival units, morale is high. If talk centres on pay and allowances, promotions and postings and on the world outside the army, you can bet money that morale is low. Applying this yardstick to the Indian Army I believe the morale of officers is low, while that of the jawans is high.
In this gloomy assessment I have illustrious company. The new Chief of Army Staff, General VK Singh, on assuming office on the 1st of April, has wisely identified the army’s “internal health” as his key focus. Pointing out that an internally vibrant army would easily swat aside external threats, the army chief has promised to revitalize traditions, core values and the army’s ethos.
Earlier chiefs, some as well-intentioned as General VK Singh, have embarked on similar paths. General K Sundarji, on taking over as chief in 1986, wrote to army officers individually, urging them to follow their professional convictions and promising to tolerate dissent. But that led nowhere as actions failed to follow words. Today, as the new chief implicitly accepts, the army has become a personality cult where officers either conform to the inclinations of the boss or get weeded out. Originality and eccentricity, those priceless attributes of a successful military leader, have been rendered extinct by a dull, humourless routine that is set by what the boss thinks his boss wants.
Keeping the officers in line is a terrible God called the Annual Confidential Report before which even the brightest and most capable officer must kneel or be scythed down. While annual reports are an evaluation tool in many professions, the army has accorded the ACR absolute control of an officer’s career. Considering that this primacy is born of the army’s laudable quest for an impartial, empirical evaluation system, it is ironic that the ACR has turned into a monster of subjectivity. If the boss is unhappy with an officer — for any reason whatsoever — a single lukewarm ACR can sink a brilliant career.
Dismantling this tyranny, and unlocking the potential of his officer corps, is the task ahead for General Singh. This is easier said than done. Blocking any radical change is the tribal ethos of the Indian Army. An officer belongs first to his regiment or battalion; only after that is he an Indian Army officer. An army chief’s first duty is towards the regiment and battalion that nurtured him; reforming the army conflicts with the role of regimental patriarch.
When General JJ Singh, an infantry officer from the Maratha Light Infantry, took over as chief, the honour guard that welcomed him to South Block was from the Marathas. So was his aide-de-camp and most of his personal staff. The tenure of his artillery successor, General Deepak Kapoor, saw the Corps of Artillery quickly muscling out the infantry as the flavour of the month. Upwardly mobile artillery officers were quickly posted into friendly environments, under “friendly” superiors, to ease their paths towards higher ranks.
These are only the most recent examples of the army’s longstanding patriarchal tradition that General VK Singh can now embrace or dismantle. A key step would be the creation of a clearly enunciated promotion policy, printed as a manual and sanctioned by the government, to ensure that each successive chief cannot tinker with the policy to suit his constituency. Today, 63 years after independence, the military has no promotion manual; policy exists only in a constantly revised torrent of letters from the Military Secretary’s branch.
The other major change that General VK Singh could implement is the reversing of promotion quotas to higher rank: the “Mandalisation” of the army as it is evocatively referred to. From the institution of the Prussian General Staff in the early 18th century, professional militaries have employed the criterion of merit alone to select their senior command. For over half a century, so did the Indian Army; but recently, in a burst of patrimonial fervour, quotas were instituted to ensure that each combat arm got its share of the senior ranks. Initiated by artillery and infantry chiefs to safeguard the interests of their officers, the quotas are now favouring less talented officers of other arms.
Few chiefs would voluntarily divest themselves of power but, paradoxically, the institution of the COAS would be greatly strengthened by transparency and the absence of discretion in promotions and postings. It would also free army chiefs from accusations of prejudice; a lever that Ministry of Defence officials — and in one well-known case, a defence minister — have successfully employed to demand favours for their own candidates.
In this gloomy assessment I have illustrious company. The new Chief of Army Staff, General VK Singh, on assuming office on the 1st of April, has wisely identified the army’s “internal health” as his key focus. Pointing out that an internally vibrant army would easily swat aside external threats, the army chief has promised to revitalize traditions, core values and the army’s ethos.
Earlier chiefs, some as well-intentioned as General VK Singh, have embarked on similar paths. General K Sundarji, on taking over as chief in 1986, wrote to army officers individually, urging them to follow their professional convictions and promising to tolerate dissent. But that led nowhere as actions failed to follow words. Today, as the new chief implicitly accepts, the army has become a personality cult where officers either conform to the inclinations of the boss or get weeded out. Originality and eccentricity, those priceless attributes of a successful military leader, have been rendered extinct by a dull, humourless routine that is set by what the boss thinks his boss wants.
Keeping the officers in line is a terrible God called the Annual Confidential Report before which even the brightest and most capable officer must kneel or be scythed down. While annual reports are an evaluation tool in many professions, the army has accorded the ACR absolute control of an officer’s career. Considering that this primacy is born of the army’s laudable quest for an impartial, empirical evaluation system, it is ironic that the ACR has turned into a monster of subjectivity. If the boss is unhappy with an officer — for any reason whatsoever — a single lukewarm ACR can sink a brilliant career.
Dismantling this tyranny, and unlocking the potential of his officer corps, is the task ahead for General Singh. This is easier said than done. Blocking any radical change is the tribal ethos of the Indian Army. An officer belongs first to his regiment or battalion; only after that is he an Indian Army officer. An army chief’s first duty is towards the regiment and battalion that nurtured him; reforming the army conflicts with the role of regimental patriarch.
When General JJ Singh, an infantry officer from the Maratha Light Infantry, took over as chief, the honour guard that welcomed him to South Block was from the Marathas. So was his aide-de-camp and most of his personal staff. The tenure of his artillery successor, General Deepak Kapoor, saw the Corps of Artillery quickly muscling out the infantry as the flavour of the month. Upwardly mobile artillery officers were quickly posted into friendly environments, under “friendly” superiors, to ease their paths towards higher ranks.
These are only the most recent examples of the army’s longstanding patriarchal tradition that General VK Singh can now embrace or dismantle. A key step would be the creation of a clearly enunciated promotion policy, printed as a manual and sanctioned by the government, to ensure that each successive chief cannot tinker with the policy to suit his constituency. Today, 63 years after independence, the military has no promotion manual; policy exists only in a constantly revised torrent of letters from the Military Secretary’s branch.
The other major change that General VK Singh could implement is the reversing of promotion quotas to higher rank: the “Mandalisation” of the army as it is evocatively referred to. From the institution of the Prussian General Staff in the early 18th century, professional militaries have employed the criterion of merit alone to select their senior command. For over half a century, so did the Indian Army; but recently, in a burst of patrimonial fervour, quotas were instituted to ensure that each combat arm got its share of the senior ranks. Initiated by artillery and infantry chiefs to safeguard the interests of their officers, the quotas are now favouring less talented officers of other arms.
Few chiefs would voluntarily divest themselves of power but, paradoxically, the institution of the COAS would be greatly strengthened by transparency and the absence of discretion in promotions and postings. It would also free army chiefs from accusations of prejudice; a lever that Ministry of Defence officials — and in one well-known case, a defence minister — have successfully employed to demand favours for their own candidates.
Sunday, April 4, 2010
Old... But Still many of us are not knowing much about AVS-2
PIB
In a major step to improve career mobility, to fulfil aspirations and to achieve combat effectiveness by bringing down age profile of commanding officers, the Union Cabinet today approved the Ministry of Defence's proposal for effecting upgradation of 1896 posts in the Services.
Popularly known as Phase-II of the Ajay Vikram Singh Committee Report, the proposals approved today would result in reduction in stagnation. The Defence Minister Shri A K Antony had taken a personal interest in the implementation of the proposal and played a crucial role in evolving a consensus among the Services. The measures taken today will also lead to progressive promotion of junior batches without adversely affecting promotional aspects of senior batches, thereby reducing the age profile of officers in select ranks.
The upgradation will be carried out in the Army over a period of five years, in the Navy over the next ten years and in the Air Force over a period of five years. The total number of posts to be upgraded will be 1051 in the Army, 342 in the Navy and 503 in the Air Force. Of the 1051 posts in the Army, 20 are at the level of Lieutenant General and equivalent, 75 at Major General and equivalent, 222 at Brigadier and equivalent, and 734 at Colonel and equivalent. The corresponding figures in the Navy will be 4 at Vice Admiral and equivalent, 14 at Rear Admiral and equivalent, 324 at Commodore, Captain and equivalent. In the Air Force upgradation will be effected for 6 post at Air Marshal and equivalent, 21 at Air Vice Marshal and equivalent, 61 at Air Commodore and equivalent, 415 at Group Captain and equivalent.
The Cabinet also approved the proposal for the reduction in the regular cadre and corresponding increase in the support cadre consisting of Short Service Commissioned Officers and re-employed officers (for Army) as envisaged in the Ajay Vikram Singh Committee (AVSC) Report and as per requirement of the three Services irrespective of gender.
It may be recalled that the Ministry of Defence had set up a Committee on 16th July, 2001, under the Chairmanship of Shri Ajay Vikram Singh, the then Special Secretary with representatives of the three Services with an aim to achieve 'combat effectiveness' by bringing down the age profile of battalion / brigade level commanders. The Committee submitted its report on February 2003 and the Raksha Mantri accorded in principle approval to the report in September 2003. AVSC Phase-I in respect of non-select ranks i.e. Lieutenant Colonel and equivalent and below was implemented in December 2004.
Friday, April 2, 2010
New chief vows to fix Army's 'internal health'
TIMES OF INDIA
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/New-chief-vows-to-fix-Armys-internal-health/articleshow/5752194.cms
I WONDER : THE DISEASE HAS BEEN RIGHTLY DIAGNOSED . I HOPE LIKE A PROFESSIONAL DOCTOR ITS CAUSES REPEAT CAUSES AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES TOO ARE KNOWN TO HIM
NEW DELHI: As a third-generation officer, General Vijay Kumar Singh knows the poison of corruption and indiscipline is slowly but surely contaminating the once pristine environs of the armed forces. On his first full working day as the 24th army chief, he spelt out his top priority: improving the Army's "internal health".
Taking charge of the 1.13-million strong Indian Army, Gen Singh said fast modernization to build "a networked force" capable of operating in "a digitized battlefield", equal focus on the two-and-a-half fronts (China, Pakistan and counter-insurgency) and enhanced synergy with Navy-IAF would be his major thrust areas.
The message on day one was loud and clear: he means business on the corruption front. `Crackdown' is too strong a word but yes, the Army needs to ensure it retains its robust moral fibre of yore.
"Army has very strong traditions, core values and way of working, and that is what I want to emphasize. For any organization to do well, it must ensure its internal health is good. Till our internal health is not good, we cannot fight well outside," said Gen Singh.
"We have to set our own culture right. We have to ensure the image and dignity of our soldiers is upheld. To that extent, our core values, our ethos, traditions will receive due attention," he added.
This comes in the backdrop of a flurry of scandals hitting the force, ranging from liquor, meat, cereal, petrol and other scams to even sexual harassment cases, in recent times. The Sukna land scam case, in which as many as four generals were indicted by a court of inquiry, in fact, even cast a shadow on the Army chief's high office.
The oft-repeated argument that the Army draws its rank and file from the society at large, which is facing a general decline in standards of probity and integrity, does not hold water for the straight-talking new chief.
"Armed forces have their own value systems, which have to be different from civil society. As a third-generation officer, I feel that way," said Gen Singh.
Turning to the other challenges ahead, Gen Singh said the new focus on the long-neglected eastern sector did not mean the Army -- which is raising two new mountain infantry divisions and an artillery brigade for Arunachal Pradesh and Assam -- was shifting its priorities from the western front with Pakistan to the eastern one with China.
"As a country, we have challenges everywhere. We are very well prepared to tackle them. It's only that over the last two years, we have realigned the focus in the East, which is the future of India," said Gen Singh.
There is `concern' over China's rapid modernization of its 2.25-million People's Liberation Army, which is not restricted to just the Tibetan Autonomous Region but spreads all across.
"They are working to make their forces more capable of working in a digitized battlefield. We also have to ensure we become a networked force, capable of working in a joint services environment," he said.
The chief will push hard for Army's modernization, stretching from heavy 155mm artillery guns to basic infantry gear, to ensure better operational readiness across the entire spectrum of conflict. "I am looking at ensuring our deficiencies are made up in a shorter timeframe," he said.
He also articulated the Army's well-known opposition to both withdrawal of the iron-fisted Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act from Jammu and Kashmir and being dragged into combating Naxalism, which is more of a law and order, socio-economic problem, "not a secessionist movement".
Taking charge of the 1.13-million strong Indian Army, Gen Singh said fast modernization to build "a networked force" capable of operating in "a digitized battlefield", equal focus on the two-and-a-half fronts (China, Pakistan and counter-insurgency) and enhanced synergy with Navy-IAF would be his major thrust areas.
The message on day one was loud and clear: he means business on the corruption front. `Crackdown' is too strong a word but yes, the Army needs to ensure it retains its robust moral fibre of yore.
"Army has very strong traditions, core values and way of working, and that is what I want to emphasize. For any organization to do well, it must ensure its internal health is good. Till our internal health is not good, we cannot fight well outside," said Gen Singh.
"We have to set our own culture right. We have to ensure the image and dignity of our soldiers is upheld. To that extent, our core values, our ethos, traditions will receive due attention," he added.
This comes in the backdrop of a flurry of scandals hitting the force, ranging from liquor, meat, cereal, petrol and other scams to even sexual harassment cases, in recent times. The Sukna land scam case, in which as many as four generals were indicted by a court of inquiry, in fact, even cast a shadow on the Army chief's high office.
The oft-repeated argument that the Army draws its rank and file from the society at large, which is facing a general decline in standards of probity and integrity, does not hold water for the straight-talking new chief.
"Armed forces have their own value systems, which have to be different from civil society. As a third-generation officer, I feel that way," said Gen Singh.
Turning to the other challenges ahead, Gen Singh said the new focus on the long-neglected eastern sector did not mean the Army -- which is raising two new mountain infantry divisions and an artillery brigade for Arunachal Pradesh and Assam -- was shifting its priorities from the western front with Pakistan to the eastern one with China.
"As a country, we have challenges everywhere. We are very well prepared to tackle them. It's only that over the last two years, we have realigned the focus in the East, which is the future of India," said Gen Singh.
There is `concern' over China's rapid modernization of its 2.25-million People's Liberation Army, which is not restricted to just the Tibetan Autonomous Region but spreads all across.
"They are working to make their forces more capable of working in a digitized battlefield. We also have to ensure we become a networked force, capable of working in a joint services environment," he said.
The chief will push hard for Army's modernization, stretching from heavy 155mm artillery guns to basic infantry gear, to ensure better operational readiness across the entire spectrum of conflict. "I am looking at ensuring our deficiencies are made up in a shorter timeframe," he said.
He also articulated the Army's well-known opposition to both withdrawal of the iron-fisted Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act from Jammu and Kashmir and being dragged into combating Naxalism, which is more of a law and order, socio-economic problem, "not a secessionist movement".
Apex court slams government for mistreating army officer
I WONDER : AGHAST......
The Supreme Court has lashed at the Union government for mistreating an Indian Army officer and denying him his due wages despite the officer suffering crippling injuries in an accident that he met while on duty.
'We regret to say that the army officers and the army men in our country are being treated in a shabby manner by the government,' a bench of Justice Markandey Katju and Justice A K. Patnaik said Wednesday.
The apex court rued the mistreatment to the army officers and men by the government while dismissing its appeal against a Punjab and Haryana High Court order that asked the government to grant pension to army officer C.S. Sidhu after taking into account his full period of service till June 1978, when he actually retired from service.
Sidhu joined the Indian Army on short service commission in June 1968 and met with a crippling accident in November 1970. The accident eventually led to amputation of his right arm, and he also suffered a compound fracture of his thigh and jaw bone.
As Sidhu met with the accident in 1970, the army while calculating his pension considered his working tenure only till November 1970 despite the fact that he was eventually released from service in 1978.
The army accordingly fixed a very low pension for Sidhu.
'In this case, the respondent (Sidhu), who was posted at a high-altitude field area and met with an accident during discharge of his duties, was granted a meagre pension of around Rs.1,000. This is a pittance,' said the bench.
'If this is the manner in which army personnel are treated, it can only be said that it is extremely unfortunate. Army personnel are bravely defending the country even at the cost of their lives, and we feel that they should be treated in a better and more humane manner by the governmental authorities, particularly in respect of their emoluments, pension and other benefits,' the bench said.
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