Augest.21 : Indian public discourse is going through a bout of anxiety about China. An article written by a Chinese strategic expert and hosted by a prominent think tank has advocated dismembering India. Although the Chinese government has distanced itself from the article, it has caused much disquiet in India. More so, since it followed another article in the People’s Daily, which disparaged India’s political system and its trajectory of development. Further, the Indian Navy Chief’s remarks about the relative power of China and India has led to much speculation about whether we are at all capable of dealing with China.
At one level, we are certainly reading too much into the recent article. Ironically, our understanding of the Chinese political system mirrors China’s fallacious grasp of the Indian politics.
In 1959, after the Dalai Lama sought refuge in India, Sino-Indian relations sharply deteriorated. This was precipitated, among other things, by the support extended to the Tibetan cause by Indian leaders like Jayaprakash Narayan. The Chinese were unwilling to believe that these individuals were not acting at the behest of the Indian government. China’s foreign minister told the Indian vice-president that "there are many people like J.P. Narayan in China but the Chinese democracy controlled them". China’s mistaken assessment of India’s stance on Tibet eventually led to the war of 1962.
Perceptions matter. And it is time we revised our simplistic notion of a monolithic Chinese public sphere.
At another level, however, public discourse in both countries is taking its cue from the political climate. From 2003, when negotiations for settling the boundary dispute began, India-China ties seemed to improve steadily. Now there is an unmistakable feeling, particularly in India, that the relationship is gridlocked. But the problem is not simply China’s intransigence on the boundary issue. The fact is that the negotiations have progressed to a stage where both sides need to confront truly difficult choices — choices that will be influenced by wider considerations.
The Indian government is in no hurry to push ahead with the negotiations. For one thing, India wants China to make certain territorial concessions in its favour, especially in the Ladakh sector. For another, the government will have to contend with the difficult domestic politics of any settlement. The boundary agreement will require a constitutional amendment, which will have to be approved by a two-thirds majority in both houses of Parliament and by at least half the state legislatures. Not an easy task.
China, for its part, continues to claim the Tawang area of Arunachal Pradesh. Twice in the past, in 1960 and in 1980, Beijing offered to drop all its claims in this area if India accepted Chinese claims in Ladakh. India’s refusal to consider the proposal led the Chinese to press their claims on Tawang, for this was an area that had close religious ties with Tibet.
China’s current stance reflects its desire to extract important concessions from India vis-a-vis Tibet. As part of a settlement where China drops its claim to Tawang, it seems to seek some move by India to curb the Tibetan emigres — perhaps by dissolving the Tibetan parliament-in-exile operating in India. The Indian government does not recognise the government-in-exile and has insisted that it does not allow the organisation to conduct political activities. But the Chinese are looking for stronger and more tangible action by India.
We should also note that China’s hardening stance on Tawang has followed its mounting concern about Tibet. These were considerably increased by the protests ahead of the Olympics last year. Indeed, the Defence White Paper published last year noted that Tibetan separatism is a major challenge for China. The Chinese also believe that the problem will be conclusively resolved only after the Dalai Lama passes on. This seems another reason why the Chinese are moving slowly on the boundary negotiations.
The polemics emanating from China also indicate that Beijing’s concerns about India go beyond the boundary and Tibet. The potential competition from India is seen not so much in the military or economic spheres as in the exercise of international influence. The Maoist state could at least claim leadership of the third world by offering a contrast to the first and second. China today provides no ideological leadership to any segment of the international system.
In the three decades following Mao Zedong’s death, the Chinese state could afford to ignore this and focus solely on its own development. Now that it has arrived as a major player, the issue needs to be addressed. Closely related to this is the question of what might be an alternative global system led by China. After all, great powers not only possess large economic and military resources, but can set the agenda of international politics. Here, a rising India, for all its problems, may have an edge.
Beyond analysing attitudes and intentions is the key task of managing our relations with China. As China and India rise in the international system, they will find themselves in a competitive relationship. Power, as Lord Acton observed, corrupts. When a state’s power increases, its conception of its interests also expands. Adm. Sureesh Mehta correctly noted that the Indian Ocean region will be an area where both sides will jostle for pre-eminence and that we need to adopt niche capabilities to preserve our interests. The Indian Army’s efforts to scale up its forces and logistical bases along the borders are steps in the right direction too.
But competition does not imply conflict. The challenge for India will be to keep its powder dry without getting pulled into a spiral of suspicion and misperception. For rising powers tend to view their own preparations as defensive and those of others as offensive. In such a context, the line between deterrence and provocation is rather a fine one. Unless we are conscious of this, we may be caught up in an avoidable conflict. And then we may have to agree with the cartoon character Pogo, who famously said: We have met the enemy, and he is us.
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