Ashok K Mehta
The most recent Chinese intrusion last week in Chamoli by the People’s Liberation Army has been denied by the Indo-Tibetan Border Police manning the border. On the India-China border, there is neither an international boundary nor even a mutually recognised demarcation of the border. Instead there are two Lines of Actual Control — one Chinese, the other Indian. Confusion is understandable though clearly the PLA has adopted a more aggressive posture on the border.
India-China relations are characterised in three ways. Fine, moving in the right direction; hot economics, cold politics — stuck on border disputes though China is India’s largest trading partner; rapidly deteriorating, verging on a pre-1962 scenario. Overall the view of India’s stance is one of appeasement, diffident diplomacy and criminal neglect of the border infrastructure and modernisation of the military. The PLA, not the civilian establishment, is calling the shots, delaying resolution of the border dispute till India will accept a solution on China’s terms.
The latest border intrusions across China’s version of the LAC in the western sector is in a brand new area. Despite the Army usually playing down such forays, the Chinese have described Indian allegations as ‘groundless and based on incidents which never happened’. Fruitless border negotiations have been on since 1981.
From 1981 to 1987, there were eight rounds of negotiations followed by 14 meetings of a Joint Working Group, supported by boundary experts, from 1988 to 2002. Thirteen rounds of a higher political dialogue of Special Representatives from 2003 to date have been equally barren.
The two sides attempted demarcation of LAC and exchanged maps on the central sector. But the Chinese abandoned the exercise in favour of a political solution. Here too, they reneged on ‘political parameters and guidelines’ that required not disturbing settled population centres and ensuring the dialogue on the border issues stayed in limbo. Masking its failure, the Special Representatives expanded the scope of their biannual meeting to incorporate strategic issues. In short, the border talks have hit another cul de sac.
Since Premier Chou En-lai offered a status quo — the famous swap deal of Arunachal Pradesh for Aksai Chin in 1960, the Chinese position has been hardening. The stance stiffened in 2005 due to India’s growing economy and stature, ‘Look East’ policy and Indo-American strategic partnership, among other reasons. The Tibetan uprising in 2008 and riots in Xinjiang in 2009 have fanned Chinese insecurity. The PLA, which enjoys considerable autonomy, is not prepared for any compromise on the border issue.
Chinese strategy has been one of buying time and peace on the borders through Treaties of Peace and Tranquillity (1993) and Confidence Building Measures (1996) which enabled modernisation of the economy and the PLA. As the satisfied power, China has sought and achieved status quo in the west by adding depth to Aksai Chin; India, which wants status quo in the east, is having to reassert its claim to Arunachal Pradesh which the Chinese have systematically undermined beginning 2006 and coinciding with the India visit of President Hu Jintao.
While the Chinese have developed infrastructure and military capacity to break the status quo in the east, India has allowed the asymmetries in deterrence to grow and lost the cutting edge to retake Aksai Chin. With the military and strategic balance in favour of PLA, China will further delay any border settlement till it can secure concessions in Arunachal Pradesh, at the very least Tawang, which will give it the equivalent of another Chumbi Valley.
Some Indian commentators are painting scare scenarios of PLA seizing Tawang next month or latest by 2012, all of Arunachal Pradesh. This is bizarre. The PLA will follow Chairman Mao’s dictum of winning the war without fighting it. True, the PLA has the capacity to mobilise 20 to 25 divisions in one campaigning season but despite India having serious catching up to do, it will be no cakewalk as in 1962. Last month, the PLA began its largest military manoeuvre: Exercise Stride, involving four divisions of 50,000 soldiers. This two-month long operation entails testing PLA capability of inter-theatre switching of forces.
Coping with the impressive modernisation of PLA will require significant transfer of resources from west to east and consolidation of existing capacities in Eastern Command. The capabilities being created now to meet the PLA challenge were envisaged in 1985 in the 15-year Long Term Perspective Plan. A Strike Corp for the east (including one airborne division) was mooted then but not sanctioned. Economic factors trumped security imperatives even as the Wangdung incident clearly demonstrated that the PLA appreciated strength rather than timidity.
A number of senior military officers including the former Air Force and Navy Chiefs have lamented the lack of strategic orientation to cope with PLA military superiority. Curiously both these officers went public about our operational deficiencies on the eve of their retirement. The Chiefs of Staff are also culpable in the neglect on the China front and preoccupation with Pakistan.
Meanwhile, a media war and barbed exchanges between Chinese and Indian intellectuals have vitiated border tensions. Chinese thinkers are saying that India is no match against their country’s comprehensive national power and this time there will be no military withdrawal like in 1962 and certainly no concessions on the border dispute. In a lengthy essay one of them suggested breaking up India into 30 pieces. According to them there cannot be two suns in the same sky.
Distrust and misinformation are at a new high. Air Chief Marshal Fali Major said: “We know so little about China.” We are forever downplaying Chinese threats; diffidence and appeasement characterise our responses. A China admirer, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh once said, “I wish India could be like China”. India has no long-term policy to deal with the so-called peaceful rise of China.
While keeping its powder dry, India needs to be firm and more assertive on the border dispute, seeking a time limit for its resolution. The Dalai Lama has said that Tawang belongs to India. When he goes there in November this year after being refused permission on an earlier occasion, he could say: Tawang is an integral part of India.(PIONEER)
The most recent Chinese intrusion last week in Chamoli by the People’s Liberation Army has been denied by the Indo-Tibetan Border Police manning the border. On the India-China border, there is neither an international boundary nor even a mutually recognised demarcation of the border. Instead there are two Lines of Actual Control — one Chinese, the other Indian. Confusion is understandable though clearly the PLA has adopted a more aggressive posture on the border.
India-China relations are characterised in three ways. Fine, moving in the right direction; hot economics, cold politics — stuck on border disputes though China is India’s largest trading partner; rapidly deteriorating, verging on a pre-1962 scenario. Overall the view of India’s stance is one of appeasement, diffident diplomacy and criminal neglect of the border infrastructure and modernisation of the military. The PLA, not the civilian establishment, is calling the shots, delaying resolution of the border dispute till India will accept a solution on China’s terms.
The latest border intrusions across China’s version of the LAC in the western sector is in a brand new area. Despite the Army usually playing down such forays, the Chinese have described Indian allegations as ‘groundless and based on incidents which never happened’. Fruitless border negotiations have been on since 1981.
From 1981 to 1987, there were eight rounds of negotiations followed by 14 meetings of a Joint Working Group, supported by boundary experts, from 1988 to 2002. Thirteen rounds of a higher political dialogue of Special Representatives from 2003 to date have been equally barren.
The two sides attempted demarcation of LAC and exchanged maps on the central sector. But the Chinese abandoned the exercise in favour of a political solution. Here too, they reneged on ‘political parameters and guidelines’ that required not disturbing settled population centres and ensuring the dialogue on the border issues stayed in limbo. Masking its failure, the Special Representatives expanded the scope of their biannual meeting to incorporate strategic issues. In short, the border talks have hit another cul de sac.
Since Premier Chou En-lai offered a status quo — the famous swap deal of Arunachal Pradesh for Aksai Chin in 1960, the Chinese position has been hardening. The stance stiffened in 2005 due to India’s growing economy and stature, ‘Look East’ policy and Indo-American strategic partnership, among other reasons. The Tibetan uprising in 2008 and riots in Xinjiang in 2009 have fanned Chinese insecurity. The PLA, which enjoys considerable autonomy, is not prepared for any compromise on the border issue.
Chinese strategy has been one of buying time and peace on the borders through Treaties of Peace and Tranquillity (1993) and Confidence Building Measures (1996) which enabled modernisation of the economy and the PLA. As the satisfied power, China has sought and achieved status quo in the west by adding depth to Aksai Chin; India, which wants status quo in the east, is having to reassert its claim to Arunachal Pradesh which the Chinese have systematically undermined beginning 2006 and coinciding with the India visit of President Hu Jintao.
While the Chinese have developed infrastructure and military capacity to break the status quo in the east, India has allowed the asymmetries in deterrence to grow and lost the cutting edge to retake Aksai Chin. With the military and strategic balance in favour of PLA, China will further delay any border settlement till it can secure concessions in Arunachal Pradesh, at the very least Tawang, which will give it the equivalent of another Chumbi Valley.
Some Indian commentators are painting scare scenarios of PLA seizing Tawang next month or latest by 2012, all of Arunachal Pradesh. This is bizarre. The PLA will follow Chairman Mao’s dictum of winning the war without fighting it. True, the PLA has the capacity to mobilise 20 to 25 divisions in one campaigning season but despite India having serious catching up to do, it will be no cakewalk as in 1962. Last month, the PLA began its largest military manoeuvre: Exercise Stride, involving four divisions of 50,000 soldiers. This two-month long operation entails testing PLA capability of inter-theatre switching of forces.
Coping with the impressive modernisation of PLA will require significant transfer of resources from west to east and consolidation of existing capacities in Eastern Command. The capabilities being created now to meet the PLA challenge were envisaged in 1985 in the 15-year Long Term Perspective Plan. A Strike Corp for the east (including one airborne division) was mooted then but not sanctioned. Economic factors trumped security imperatives even as the Wangdung incident clearly demonstrated that the PLA appreciated strength rather than timidity.
A number of senior military officers including the former Air Force and Navy Chiefs have lamented the lack of strategic orientation to cope with PLA military superiority. Curiously both these officers went public about our operational deficiencies on the eve of their retirement. The Chiefs of Staff are also culpable in the neglect on the China front and preoccupation with Pakistan.
Meanwhile, a media war and barbed exchanges between Chinese and Indian intellectuals have vitiated border tensions. Chinese thinkers are saying that India is no match against their country’s comprehensive national power and this time there will be no military withdrawal like in 1962 and certainly no concessions on the border dispute. In a lengthy essay one of them suggested breaking up India into 30 pieces. According to them there cannot be two suns in the same sky.
Distrust and misinformation are at a new high. Air Chief Marshal Fali Major said: “We know so little about China.” We are forever downplaying Chinese threats; diffidence and appeasement characterise our responses. A China admirer, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh once said, “I wish India could be like China”. India has no long-term policy to deal with the so-called peaceful rise of China.
While keeping its powder dry, India needs to be firm and more assertive on the border dispute, seeking a time limit for its resolution. The Dalai Lama has said that Tawang belongs to India. When he goes there in November this year after being refused permission on an earlier occasion, he could say: Tawang is an integral part of India.(PIONEER)
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