Need to devise a suitable strategy
by K Padmanabhaiah
by K Padmanabhaiah
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has reiterated his consistent view that Naxalism poses the gravest internal security threat. He also stated that “We have not achieved as much success as we would have liked in containing this menace.”
During the last one or two months the Union Home Ministry revisited the entire Naxal issue, and launched a series of new initiatives while at the same time strengthening some of the existing anti-Naxalite programmes. A new elite anti-Naxalite force, “CoBRA”, was established. For the first time pro-active steps have been taken to search, seek and destroy arms dumps of the Naxalites by entering into their strongholds in the jungles instead of the reactive and defensive approach followed till now. How effective are these new initiatives going to be? Has the state at last put aside its vacillating policies and are the state governments and the Centre on the same wavelength in their resolve to fight Naxalism, and is there broad agreement in the anti-Naxal policies and programmes ?
Naxalism in India had its beginnings at Naxalbari in West Bengal in the late sixties as a peasant uprising, but was brought under control by 1972. Around the same time it made its presence felt in a big way in Srikakulam district of Andhra Pradesh but by 1972 it was rooted out from the district by determined police action coupled with a serious and sincere developmental effort. However, by 1980 Naxalism took fresh roots in Andhra Pradesh with the formation of the People’s War Group (PWG). It was able to garner intellectual support from some writers, poets and human rights activists. The state followed off and on a vacillating policy of police encounters and peace parleys leading to escalation in Naxal violence.
The year 2005 was described as one of the bloodiest years in Andhra Pradesh as a result of Naxal-police clashes. As recently as in 2006, Andhra Pradesh was being described as a citadel of Naxalism. However, in the last two years Naxalite violence has been controlled in the state very effectively.
In Bihar, Naxalism made its entry into Shahar and Sandesh blocks of Bhojpur district and held sway over this and some other districts for over one decade. Here again during the last two years or so, the government by successful implementation of development programmes at the grassroot levels has been able to make a very strong dent in these two developmental blocks which were the erstwhile strongholds of Naxals.
It is said that the most important factor in ending Maoist dominance in Bihar was panchayat elections. Similarly, it is reported that effective implementation of the Aaswad Project (Aapki Sarkar Aapke Dwar) in Jehanabad district from 2006 seems to have curtailed Maoist influence. Currently the worst-affected states are Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra.
Some basic questions that need to be answered are: What is Naxalism ? Who is a Naxalite? How is the movement financed and sustained? Who constitute the first and second rung leadership? Who constitute the cadres? What percentage of tribals are with the Naxals? Are the tribals or other poorer sections in remote areas being held hostage by the Naxals? The Naxalite leadership does not believe in the state, has no faith in the democratic or parliamentary system of governance, opposes elections, and believes in an armed struggle to overthrow the state.
With all its shortcomings in actual practice, parliamentary democracy has taken root in the country and people voluntarily subscribing to the Naxalite philosophy will be minuscule. Studies of the growth of Naxalism in specific districts have shown that a couple of Naxal leaders from outside ( mostly from Andhra or Bihar) visit the village chosen for making inroads, identify a local person who feels highly aggrieved with the scheme of things in the village, and form a local committee with a couple of other youth under that person’s leadership and give him a couple of guns. The gun helps in extortions.
With a handsome amount of development funds flowing into the rural areas under various schemes, including the NREGA, extortion from the village-level leadership either in collusion or coercion becomes easier. Any resistance is met with extreme and brutal violence. More extortions give more guns and more IEDs.
There is no doubt that Naxalism is the strongest in the remote hilly, forested and underdeveloped areas in the country where the physical (roads, communications, electricity, etc) as well as social infrastructure like schools, health centres, water supply, and policing is abysmally poor. In the absence of adequate policing, the vacuum is occupied by the Naxal ideologues. There is no security and some of the locals are coerced to join the movement. Even food security is a problem in many of these areas.
There is exploitation of the illiterate and the poor by landlords, forest contractors, beedi manufacturers, mining companies, et al. The administration also is very thinly spread and, more often than not, in cohorts with the rich and the powerful. The grievances of the locals are either not heard, or not redressed with any sympathy. The exploited, alienated and frustrated locals form the base of recruitment to the cadres. To win more recruits, Naxal leaders have been saying that they are prepared to support any cause of the exploited masses.
Half-hearted attempts at some development works like roads or electricity supply lines or communication towers are thwarted by the Naxal groups as they have a vested interest in the area remaining undeveloped.
Therefore, arguments like whether emphasis should be on development rather than on policing, or, as someone has put it, welfare vs warfare is futile. Since Naxalite philosophy is based on armed violent conflict with the state, it has to be met and neutralised squarely by a series of adequate policing actions, including intelligence gathering. Simultaneously, determined and sincere efforts must be made to develop these areas by way of physical and social infrastructure, and adequate governmental presence. Mere development alone would not help unless there is empowerment of the local people and a convincing effort in providing social justice.
One can draw lessons from the experience of Andhra Pradesh also. The state government raised a dedicated police force called Grey Hounds in 1989 to fight Naxalism. But the police had to fight a lone battle against the Naxals, with only nominal support by other wings of the administration or even the political leadership in the state. The political leadershlip in a way abdicated its responsibility by merely shifting its political burden to the police, leaving the latter to cope with it to the best of its ability. There was no firm policy with a couple of years of the ban followed by peace overtures mostly on the eve of the Assembly elections. Naxalite groups were banned in 1992, and the same was lifted in 1995 when talks were held for one year. Talks were started in May 2002 but the same colllapsed in 45 days.
Again talks were promised on the eve of elections in May 2004, and seven rounds of talks were held, which collapsed in January 2005. An interesting development was that while the talks were on, the PWG merged with the CPI (M-L) and the MCC in September 2004 to form the CPI (Maoist), a formidable force. This switch-on-switch-off policy was ultimately given up, and in the last two years a multi-pronged strategy of strong police action coupled with sensible development activities led to a great improvement in curbing Naxalism in the state.
The government is now fully conscious of the magnitude of the Naxalite challenge. For a change there is determination to fight the menace with all means available to the government. There is a commonality of purpose between the Centre and state governments, and they are following a proactive policy, both as regards policing and development. This should yield the necessary results. However, the government should be conscious of the fact that Naxalites are now spreading their tentacles into marine warfare (their actions in the riverine areas bordering Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Orissa and their attack on the Grey Hound force in Balimela reservoir), into mobile warfare (in Jharkhand), into communal clashes (Kandhamal) and into urban areas (Maharashtra) and hence the need to devise a suitable strategy to handle them.
The writer is a former Union Home Secretary
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